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The Domestic Politics of International
Extradition
WILLIAM MAGNUSON
Extradition poses a set of unique challenges for current theories of
international law. State decisions regarding extradition involve the intersection
of domestic criminal law, complex international treaties, and often overtly
political considerations, thus def ing neat explanation by legal theorists. This
Article argues that current theory fails to adequately explain the international
law of extradition because it relies on state-centric models of international
relations. By focusing our attention on unitary state interests, commentators
overlook the important ways in which domestic politics shapes and influences
state behavior. More particulary, this Article argues that domestic groups and
institutions both constrain and empower government decision-makers in
structuring international extradition arrangements. Government officals often
have conflicting incentives regarding extradition decisions, and these tensions
help explain the tradeoffs states have made between commitment and flexibility
in extradition treaties. A closer examination of the incentives of domestic actors
in extradition decisions also reveals a deeper issue that current theory overlooks:
the possibility of "compliance uncertainty," or situations where states are unsure
what actions count as compliance. Compliance uncertainty has fundamental
consequences for the structure, substance, and practice of extradition treaties, as
well as for international law in general
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the antisecrecy website WikiLeaks released a trove of nearly
400,000 confidential documents related to the Iraq war, exposing, among
other things, that the United States had systematically ignored reports of
torture by Iraqi authorities.' WikiLeaks promised to release another batch
of documents in a matter of months. 2 The publication of the documents
was an embarrassment for the U.S. government but proved a boon to
Julian Assange, the director of WikiLeaks, who found himself hailed as a
prophet of the new age of government accountability. 3 Soon after the
release of the first batch of documents, however, Assange learned that
authorities in Sweden sought him for questioning regarding charges of
sexual assault by two WikiLeaks volunteers.4 He fled to London, where he
was arrested by British police pursuant to a Swedish warrant.5 Sweden
submitted a request for his extradition to the United Kingdom, and a
British court granted the request.6 Assange protested that the extradition
request was politically motivated and could potentially lead to his
imprisonment in Guantanamo, the notorious U.S. prison for terrorism
suspects. The case is currently on appeal.7
In 1977, Roman Polanski, one of the world's most well-respected
filmmakers, was arrested in Los Angeles on charges of sexually assaulting a
thirteen-year-old girl.8 Before he could be sentenced, however, Polanski
fled the country and returned to his home in France, where he remained
1. See David Leigh & Maggie O'Kane, US Turned Over Captives to Iraq Torture Squads, GUARDIAN,
Oct. 25, 2010, at 1.
2. See Dylan Welch, Fugitive to Leak Secret Airstrike Video, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, june 18,
2010, at 3.
3. See Tim Blair, Plugging Leak in Pool ofHypocrites, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 16, 2011, at 1.
4. SeeJeanne Whalen, Sweden QuestionsAssange's Departure, WALL ST.J., Feb. 8, 2011, at A8.
5. Id. There is some debate about whether Assange fled Sweden or merely left for London for
other reasons. The court concluded that it was "a reasonable assumption from the facts (albeit not
necessarily an accurate one) that Mr Assange was deliberately avoiding interrogation in the period
before he left Sweden." Id. at 10.
6. See Ravi Somaiya, Briish Court Grants Sweden's Request for Extradition of the Founder of Wikileaks,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, at A4.
7. Id.
8. For a discussion of the case, and a more thorough analysis of its background, see Jeffrey
Toobin, The Celebrity Defense: Sex, Fame, and the Case of Roman Polanski, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 14,
2009, at 50.
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free for several decades.9 When U.S. authorities learned that Polanski
would be traveling to Switzerland in 2009 to receive a film award, they
presented the Swiss with an arrest warrant.'0 Swiss police took Polanski
into custody, and U.S. authorities promptly filed an extradition request
with the Swiss government." Polanski and others protested that the
request was politically motivated and illegal.12 After deliberating for several
months, a Swiss court denied the U.S. extradition request, allowing
Polanski to go free.'3
Two cases, similar facts, and yet different results. What distinguishes the
two cases? In both, an individual committed a crime in one country, fled
to another, and was subsequently arrested for extradition to the original
country.14 On the surface, the facts are similar, but the results diverge: In
Assange's case, it appears likely that Sweden's extradition request will be
granted; in Polanski's case, the United States' extradition request was
denied.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Henry Chu, The World: Polanski is Facing Months in Swiss Prison, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009,
at Al9.
12. See Roman Polanski, I Can Remain Silent No Longer, LA REGALE Du JEU (May 2, 2010, 8:04
PM), http://tinyurl.com/2vrrhss; Jeremy Kay, Roman Polanski Arrest: Hollywood Unites in His Defence,
GUARDIAN FILM BLOG (Sept. 28, 2009, 11:57 PM), http://tinyurl.com/y99ap55. Much of
Hollywood united in Polanski's defense, from comments that he did not commit "rape-rape" to
descriptions of his behavior as a "so-called crime." See Michael Kimmelman, A Gallic Shrug, Preserve of
Artistes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at WK1. Indeed, Polanski received an outpouring of support in
the days after his arrest. The French writers' guild, SACD, published a petition demanding Polanski's
release and stating that "[fjilm-makers in France, in Europe, in the United States and around the
world are dismayed by this decision." David Charter & Chris Ayres, Holywood Divided in Support for
jailed Director Polansk, TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 30, 2009, at 5. Celebrities as prominent as Martin
Scorsese, David Lynch, and Woody Allen signed the petition. John Horn & Tina Daunt, A Cultural
Divide Over Polanski, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at Dl. Another petition, sponsored by French
philosopher Bernard Henri-Levy, said, "We ask the Swiss courts to free him immediately and not to
tum this ingenious filmmaker into a martyr of a politico-legal imbroglio that is unworthy of two
democracies like Switzerland and the United States." Jennifer Harper, Roman Polanski Case Ignites
Culture Debate: Celebrities Weigh In On His Arrest, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at Al. This petition
received support from Steven Soderbergh, Salman Rushdie, and Milan Kundera, among others.
Toobin, supra note 8. The indignation was not limited to cultural figures. French President Nicolas
Sarkozy said that Polanski's arrest was "not a good administration of justice." Guillaume Tabard &
Phillipe Goulliaud, Nicolas Sarkoy: 1 Am Determined to Fight Against All Reactionary and Intransigent
Forces", LE FIGARO, Oct. 15, 2009, at 2.
13. See Deborah Ball & Tamara Audi, Polanski Free as Extradition Rejected, WALL ST. J., July 13,
2010,at A3.
14. For the purposes of this discussion, I assume that Assange and Polanski actually committed
the crimes of which they are accused. Polanski plead guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse but was
never sentenced. See Eugene Robinson, Injustice: The Director's Cut, WASH. POST, July 13, 2010, at A15.
Because Assange is still awaiting extradition, his guilt has not yet been adjudicated by a court ofjustice. See Ravi Somaiya, Founder of WikiLeaks Is Ordered Freed on Bail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2010, at
A12.
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One response is that, on closer inspection, the legally relevant facts are
not as similar as they appear. Polanski argued that he had actually served
his period of imprisonment,'5 while there is no question that Assange has
not been sentenced or confined.16 Polanski committed his crimes over
thirty years before the extradition request, whereas Assange's actions
occurred just a matter of weeks before Sweden's extradition request.
Polanski's victim openly called for dismissal of the case,'7 while there are
no signs that Assange's accusers are backing off their charges.
Another response recognizes that the legal aspects of the two cases are
similar but stresses the different political dimensions of the Polanski and
Assange extraditions. Polanski was a world-acclaimed director with wide
support in the public, while Assange had earned the enmity of
governments around the world for his attack on government secrecy and
confidential communications. The United States requested Polanski's
extradition from Switzerland, a country long lauded for its neutrality in
world affairs and, at the time, facing tough scrutiny from the United States
for its bank secrecy laws.' 8 Sweden and the United Kingdom enjoy close
relations, with the Swedish and British prime ministers going so far as to
coauthor a recent opinion article in the Financial Times.19 Polanski's
imprisonment arguably contributed little to serious national security
interests, while Assange's WikiLeaks presented a major diplomatic and
security problem for the Obama Administration.20 According to this
response, the different results in the Polanski and Assange extraditions are
best explained by politics.
But to dismiss these cases as merely nonanalogous, either legally or
politically, is to ignore the very real connection between domestic politics
and international law. In both cases, domestic institutions purported to
ground their decisions in interpretations of international extradition
treaties.21 These treaties were in turn negotiated by government actors with
15. See David Itzkoff, A Free Man, Polanski Is Seen at Montreaux Festival N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010,
at C3.
16. See Jane Croft and Tim Bradshaw, Assange to Fight Extradition Ruling, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb.
25, 2011, at 4.
17. See Harriet Ryan, Polanski's Victim to Request End to Extradiion Efforts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2010, at A8.
18. The United States had launched an investigation into a number of major Swiss banks in order
to determine whether they were enabling American citizens to engage in tax evasion. See Evan Perez,
Feds Press Swiss Bank to Name U.S. Clients, WALL ST.J., July 1, 2008, at Al.
19. David Cameron and Fredrick Reinfeldt, Reining in Europe's Deficit Is First Step, FINANCIAL
TIMES, June 16, 2010, at 11.
20. See Scott Shane, U.S. Pressing Its Crackdown Against Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2011, at Al.
21. The United States requested Polanski's extradition under an extradition treaty with
Switzerland. Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Switzerland, Nov. 14, 1990, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-9, Art. 2. Sweden requested
Assange's extradition under a European Arrest Warrant, a multilateral extradition system covering all
the member states of the European Union. Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June
[Vol. 52:839
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particular interests and incentives. Without a fuller understanding of the
way that domestic politics shapes and influences the preferences of
domestic actors in international law, any explanation of the Polanski and
Assange cases must be incomplete.
Where scholars have addressed extradition as a phenomenon of
international law, they have tended to explain extradition treaties as
products of rational interchanges between states: Two states have an
interest in preventing and punishing criminal acts, and extradition is one
tool in pursuing that interest. Under this analysis, states conclude
extradition treaties in order to promote cooperation in penal matters and
to ensure the enforcement of domestic criminal law. They comply with
their extradition obligations out of a respect for comity and the equality of
sovereigns. 22 This approach, however, fails to explain many of the key
contours of extradition law today. If states have an interest in cooperative
extradition proceedings, why do they need treaties at all? Why do they
include a number of exceptions to extradition obligations that arguably
threaten to overwhelm the fundamental purposes of extradition treaties?
Finally, why do states at times breach their extradition agreements with
other states?
These questions remain largely unanswered because most theorists have
understood extradition as a state-level phenomenon, best explained as a
process of cooperation between countries. 23 Thus, most extradition
scholars overlook the key variable in extradition law, domestic institutions
and interest groups. Domestic politics creates the demand for extradition
treaties, but also distorts the formation and interpretation of these treaties
in predictable ways. Perhaps most importantly, the structure of interest-
group politics at a local level may heavily influence a state's decision
whether to comply with its obligations under extradition treaties. For
example, a state may have a general interest in promoting cooperative
relations on criminal matters with a neighboring country. However, a
2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States, [2002]
O.J. (L 190) 1. For discussions of the European Arrest Warrant's operation and implementation, see
Susie Alegre & Marisa Leaf, Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon?
Case Study-The European Arrest Warrant, 10 EUR. L.J. 200 (2004); Jan Komarek, European
Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: In Search of the Limits of "Contrapunctual Principles," 44
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 9 (2007); Robin Loof, Shooting from the Hip: Proposed Minimum Rsghts in
Criminal Proceedings Throughout the EU, 12 EUR. L.J. 421 (2006); Oreste Pollicino, European Arrest
Warrant and Constitutional Principles of the Member States: A Case Law-Based Outline in the Attempt to Strike
the Rzght Balance Between Interacting Legal Systems, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1313 (2008); Daniel Sarmiento,
European Union: The European Arrest Warrant and the Quest for Constitutional Coherence, 6 INT'L J. CONST.
L. 171 (2008); J.R. Spencer, Implementing the European Arrest Warrant: A Tale of How Not to Do It, 30
STATUTE L. REV. 184 (2009).
22. See Chimene I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 55, 93 (2011).
23. See id. at 58; Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism
and the Intersection ofNational and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121, 132-34 (2007).
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government decision-maker pondering the decision whether to enter into
an extradition treaty with a neighboring country may be affected by more
parochial incentives, such as expanding agency competences, earning
campaign contributions, or gaining re-election, incentives that may not
align perfectly with the general interest of the state. Once a decision has
been made to negotiate a treaty, the question arises of what sort of
substance to include in the treaty. A broadly inclusive and rigorous treaty
may be desirable for a country interested in deterring crime, but if
powerful interest groups lobby in favor of certain exceptions to the treaty,
or if decision-makers predict that certain kinds of extraditions may be
politically harmful, incentives arise for negotiators to reduce the scope of
the treaty or include escape hatches from otherwise obligatory treaty
provisions. Once the treaty has entered into force, states that expect to
interact with each other regularly through the agreement will likely have an
interest in complying with their obligations, if only to ensure that the other
side has a stake in continuing to comply with their own obligations. A
breach of treaty obligations could lead to wider and potentially longer-term
harm to the state's reputation for law-abidingness. Domestic decision-
makers, however, who sometimes do not internalize long-term
consequences but often face short-term exigencies, may have incentives to
breach the agreement when domestic interest groups are sufficiently
mobilized against compliance. These effects are only exacerbated when
domestic processes operate to obscure or justify the breach.
A domestic politics approach to extradition law brings to light several
important mechanisms and failures in international legal regimes, factors
that current theories of extradition fail to identify. First, the structure of
domestic politics affects the demand for extradition treaties. Second, it
creates incentives, in certain cases, for negotiators to build in greater
flexibility for politically sensitive extradition decisions. Third, it may affect
decisions regarding whether to comply with extradition obligations,
particularly in situations of "compliance uncertainty," or when states are
unsure what actions should count as compliance. These hidden features of
state behavior can help explain why states act in the way they do, not just
in extradition decisions, but also more broadly in all treaty-based
frameworks.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly discusses the history of
extradition as a concept in international law. This Part traces the evolution
of extradition from an exclusively political phenomenon to a largely
criminal one and discusses how some prominent features of extradition
have developed. Part II examines the structure of extradition law. This
Part analyzes why states use treaties at all in order to gain control over
wanted individuals, why they overwhelmingly opt to use bilateral (as
opposed to multilateral) extradition treaties, and how they decide the level
[Vol. 52:839
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of discretion and flexibility to incorporate into their treaties. Part III
addresses the substance of international extradition treaties. This Part
looks at three key features of extradition treaties: the citizenship exception,
the rule of noninquiry, and the political offense exception. It attempts to
explain how these rules originated and what interests are furthered by their
inclusion in extradition treaties. Part IV focuses on why states comply with
their extradition obligations. This Part describes the effect of "compliance
uncertainty," or the difficulty of determining what counts as compliance,
on compliance decisions.
I. HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
The international practice of extradition, whereby a country formally
surrenders an alleged criminal to another country having jurisdiction over
the crime charged,24 has today become an institution. Every year,
thousands of individuals, from petty thieveS25 to financial fraudsterS26 to
former dictators, 27 are handed over from one country to another pursuant
to extradition treaties. The vast majority of extradition requests are
complied with; it is only the rare case when a country denies a properly
presented extradition request from a country with which it has concluded
an extradition treaty. 28 In some ways, this is an unprecedented example of
international cooperation through international law. In a world in which
many suggest that international law is not really law at all,29 the fact that
states are, in at least one area, engaging in constant and daily interactions in
compliance with the terms of international treaties is striking. On its face,
this situation would appear to support the proposition that international
law matters and has an effect on state behavior. But why does it matter?
And how does it affect state behavior? In order to answer these questions,
24. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (9th ed. 2009).
25. See Polikarpovas v. Stolic, 256 Fed. App'x 127 (9th Cir. 2007).
26. For example, in 2006, three British businessmen accused of fraud in connection with the
collapse of Enron were extradited from the United Kingdom to the United States. See John R. Cook,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 101 AJIL 100 (2007). The extradition caused an uproar in the
United Kingdom, and an emergency debate on the matter was held in the House of Commons. See
Dominic Rushe & Richard Fletcher, Poor Relations, SUNDAY TIMES (London), July 16, 2006, Business
at 5.
27. Manuel Noriega, the former general-turned-dictator of Panama, was extradited from the
United States to France in April 2010. After spending twenty years in jail in the United States on
drug-trafficking charges, Noriega was released from U.S. custody in order to stand trial for laundering
drug money in Paris. See Pierre-Antoine Souchard, In France, Noriega Back Behind Bars, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 28, 2010, at 4.
28. See John T. Parry, The Lost Histor of International Extradition Litigation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 93,
153 n.314 (2002) (noting that the U.S. "Secretary of State has refused extradition in as few as three
cases since 1940").
29. See generaly Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Realip 'Lw"?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293
(1985).
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we have to become familiar with the history of extradition and its
development through time.
Extradition treaties are some of the oldest known examples of international
law.3 0 Indeed, the oldest document of diplomatic history, the peace treaty
between Rameses II of Egypt and the Hittite prince Hattusili III in 1258
B.C., contains provisions regarding the extradition of criminals. 31 In
ancient Greece and Rome, state extradition requests stood in conflict with
the sacred right of asylum, but eventually the fear of divine retribution
gave way to political considerations. 32 This development was rooted largely
in ancient concepts of respondeat superior and vicarious liability.33 Under
30. The term "international," in this context, is used to denote relations between separate
political systems. One might argue that the term "international law" cannot properly be used to
describe treaties between groups other than modern nation-states. See THOMAS ALFRED WALKER, A
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 38 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1899) (cited in COLEMAN
PHILLIPSON, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 62
(1911)). Such a definition, however, would exclude a wide variety of international and interstate
actions that predate the rise of the nation-state after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Such a limited
understanding of the term "international" is confusing and unnecessary for our purposes.
31. The treaty purported to resolve a long-enduring conflict between Egypt and the Hittite
kingdom. During the thirteenth century B.C., the Hittite and Egyptian empires fought numerous,
savage wars over the control of disputed territory. For example, the famous Battle of Kadesh, the
largest chariot battle ever fought, was waged during this time. Weary of the many years of conflict,
Rameses and Hattusili finally agreed to a peace treaty, under which the leaders promised to maintain
peace between the empires and to lend mutual assistance in case of an attack from another country.
The treaty, a copy of which was found on an inscription on the wall of the Temple of Amun in
Egypt, also addressed the issue of criminals who had fled from one empire to the other. The treaty
stated that any such criminals would not be sheltered by the receiving king, but rather, would be
delivered up to the proper authorities in the country from which they fled. Interestingly, the treaty
provided extradited criminals some rights as against their native countries: The treaty stated, with
reference to extradited subjects, that "their tongue and their eyes are not to be pulled out; their ears
and their feet are not to be cut off; their houses with their wives and their children are not to be
destroyed." The treaty also threatened serious sanctions for any party that breached the terms of the
agreement. One provision in the treaty stated that "[i]f Rameses and the children of the country of
Egypt do not observe this treaty, then the gods and the goddesses of the country of Egypt and the
gods and the goddesses of the country of Hatti shall exterminate the descendants of Rameses, the
Great King, the king of the country of Egypt." See JAMES H. BREASTED, A HISTORY OF EGYPT
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PERSIAN CONQUEST 438 (2d ed. 1916); O.R. GURNEY, THE
HITTITES 63 (1952); GEORGE LISKA, IMPERIAL AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF
PRIMACY 13-14 (1967); JAMES PRITCHARD, ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS RELATING TO THE
OLD TESTAMENT 199-203 (1992); IVAN ANTHONY SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5 (1971) (citing FRANZ VON HOLTZENDORF, I HANDBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS 169 (1885);
W. Mettgenberg, Vor mnehr als 3000 Jabren: Ein Beitrag yr Geschichte des Ausliefermagsrechts, 23
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VOLKERRECHT 23 (1939)); see generally MARK HEALY, QADESH 1300 BC: CLASH
OF THE WARRIOR KINGS (1993).
32. Greek and Roman values concerning hospitality and the protection of guests coincided with
a strongly-held belief that the gods favored the granting of asylum. Violations of the right of asylum,
it was believed, would be met with the fierce retribution of the gods. Often, asylum was based on an
individual's proximity to certain powerful symbols. For example, the Temple of Artemis and the
Deian Temple of Apollo offered inviolable refuge to Greek suppliants, and in Rome, standing near
statues of the emperors conferred protection on criminals. See PHILLIPSON, supra note 30, at 349-58.
33. See id. at 363-64. For a discussion of the modern importance of communal responsibility, see
Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 346 (2003).
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the Roman law of noxae deditio, the father or master of a criminal could be
held liable for the actions of the criminal unless he delivered the fugitive
up to justice. 34 Thus, even if the father or master had committed no crime
himself, he was deemed guilty of the crime if he did not find and hold
responsible his child or servant. This theory of guilt "by reason of
authority" was eventually extended into the realm of international
relations. A state that harbored a foreign criminal was considered to be
poisoned or tainted by the presence of that individual, and could be held
liable for that criminal's actions. 35 If the state did not return the fugitive,
what was originally a private dispute could escalate into a public one,
requiring diplomatic negotiations or even war. The system created a strong
incentive for states to extradite fugitive criminals to the requesting
countries.
Extradition practice in ancient times was overwhelmingly characterized
by a focus on political, as opposed to private, crimes.36 Such offenses
included fomenting rebellion, violating the safety of ambassadors, and
initiating war.37 States continued to use extradition primarily as a means for
acquiring jurisdiction over political offenders, as opposed to common
criminals, well into the eighteenth century.38 Extradition treaties during
this period were rare and often involved the narrow interests of political
elites. One of the few examples was the 1661 treaty between Charles II of
England and Denmark.39 Charles II's father, Charles I, had been executed
during the English Civil War of the 1640s, leading to the abolition of the
34. See PHILLIPSON, supra note 30, at 362; see also David Johnston, Limiting Uabiity: Roman Law
and the Civill.aw Tradition, 70 CI-l.-KENT L. REV. 1515, 1527-33 (1995).
35. See PHILLIPSON, supra note 30, at 363; Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the
Doctrines ofAttribuion and Due Dihigence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 265, 278-80
(2004).
36. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 5 (2007); SIR EDWARD CLARKE, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 17-18
(London, Stevens & Haynes, 3d ed. 1888); ANDRE DE MELLO, MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
EXTRADITION AND FUGITIVE OFFENDERS APPLICABLE TO THE EASTERN DEPENDENCIES OF
THE BRITISH EMPIRE (1933); ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
214 (1954); 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 696, 704 (8th ed. 1955); SHEARER, suopra
note 31, at 5.
37. In 314 B.C., for example, the city of Sora (located in modern-day Lazio) rose up and
slaughtered a group of Roman colonists. At this time, the Roman republic was still fighting the
resilient Samnite tribes for control of the Italian peninsula and was thus particularly sensitive to
rebellions. In response to the massacre, Roman soldiers attacked the city and requested extradition of
the ringleaders of the massacre. The citizens of Sora identified and handed over 225 of the
participants in the massacre. These ringleaders were then sent to Rome, where they were flogged and
beheaded in the Forum, "to the vast delight of the common people." The town of Sora was
otherwise left unharmed. See LIVY, ROME AND ITALY 248 (Betty Radice trans., 1982).
38. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 36, at 5.
39. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 10
(1891); CLARKE, suopra note 36, at 20.
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monarchy in England for over a decade. 40 When Charles II ascended to
the throne in the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, one of his first acts
as monarch was to punish those responsible for his father's execution. To
this end, he negotiated a number of treaties with foreign states, including
the treaty with Denmark, requiring the government of Denmark to give up
regicides. 41 These types of treaties, regarding the surrender of enemies to
the sovereign, might properly be understood as gestures of friendship
between allies, methods for establishing or maintaining peaceful
relationships between countries. They also demonstrated a preeminent
concern with maintaining the status quo among reigning heads of state.42
With time, however, the scope of extradition law and its perceived
functions widened. Extradition treaties proliferated, and the substance of
those treaties came to include a greater variety of crimes and criminals.
Beginning in the eighteenth century, it became common practice for
extradition treaties to specify deserting troops as extraditable criminals. 43
In a Europe riven by dynastic rivalries and interminable conflicts, military
desertion was a major problem for armies, and some commentators have
suggested that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, extradition
treaties were chiefly concerned with military offenders. 44
By the nineteenth century, what we might consider the modern conception
of extradition began to take shape. Whereas previously extradition had
focused on narrow categories of offenders - political enemies, leaders of
rebellions, military deserters - nineteenth-century extradition treaties covered
a wide variety of common crimes. 45 The Treaty of Amiens, for example,
concluded between Great Britain and France in 1802, provided for the
extradition of individuals accused of "murder, forgery or fraudulent
40. See REBECCA FRASER, THE STORY OF BRITAIN: FROM THE ROMANS TO THE PRESENT: A
NARRATIVE HISTORY 327-77 (2005).
41. See CLARKE, supra note 36, at 20.
42. In 1834, Russia, Prussia, and Austria entered a treaty whereby they agreed to extradite any
individuals charged with high treason, lese majeste, or rebellion. Most commentators explain the treaty
as a reaction to the fear of constitutionalism and revolt in Poland. See GEOFFREY BUTLER & SIMON
MACCOBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 510 (2003).
43. A 1788 treaty between the United States and France, for example, dealt specifically with the
extradition of deserting sailors, a major issue at a time when conditions in the navy were compared
unfavorably with jail. As Samuel Johnson once observed, "'Why, sir, no man will be a sailor, who has
contrivance enough to get himself into a jail; for, being in a ship is being in a jail, with the chance of
being drowned."' James Boswell, Journal of a Tour to the Outer Hebrides nith SamuelJohnson, LLD, in
JOHNSON'S JOURNEY TO THE WESTERN ISLANDS OF SCOTLAND AND BOsVELL'S JOURNAL OF A
TOUR TO THE HEBRIDES WITH SAMUELJOHNSON, LL.D. 247 (R.W. Chapman ed., 1924).
44. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 36, at 5.
45. Of course, some extradition treaties before the nineteenth century did deal with common
criminals. See PRITCHARD, supra note 31, at 199-203; Christopher L. Blakesley, The Practice of
Extradiion fmm Aniquity to Modern France and the United States: A Brief Histoy, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 39, 48 (1981).
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bankruptcy." 46 This was a very different kind of treaty from previous ones,
for it dealt with the problem of regular crimes and torts rather than
political offenses. 47
Gradually, this new conception of the role of extradition took hold in
international treaties. Formal procedures were established for extradition
requests. Reciprocity of obligations was imposed on the parties.
Requesting states were required to state the grounds for extradition and to
justify them under the relevant treaty. Treaties set out extraditable crimes
and often included a list of nonextraditable crimes.48 Extradition finally
emerged as a decidedly "legal" phenomenon. Concomitant with the rise of
"legal" extradition came a new emphasis on courts. National courts were
regularly called upon to decide the legality of extraditions, and they quickly
developed a considerable jurisprudence in the area.49
The case of Nathan Robbins illustrates the role that the judiciary played
in extradition proceedings.50 After the French Revolution of 1789 and the
46. See JOHN D. GRAINGER, THE AMIENS TRUCE: BRITAIN AND BONAPARTE 1801-03, at 78-
79 (2004).
47. The work of Cesare Beccaria, the renowned Italian philosopher and penologist, certainly
played an important role in this development. Beccaria was interested in reforming the criminal law
system in order to make it both more effective and more just. His treatise, Crimes and Punishments,
published in 1764, argued that the death penalty should be abolished, torture prohibited, and dueling
strictly punished. In his pursuit of a criminal justice system inspired by reason, Beccaria took a keen
interest in the spread of extradition treaties, for he believed they might serve an important role in
disincentivizing crime. As he stated, "the conviction of finding nowhere a span of earth where real
crimes were pardoned might be the most efficacious way of preventing their occurrence." CESARE
BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 46 (4th ed. 1775); CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS INCLUDING A NEW TRANSLATION OF BECCARIA'S DE DELTITI E DELLE PENNE
193-94 (.A. Farrer trans., London, Chatto & Windus 1880) [hereinafter CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS]. At the same time, he worried that extradition, if not implemented justly, might lead
to oppression. Thus, he wrote,
I shall not pretend to determine this question [whether nations should extradite criminals],
until laws more conformable to the necessities and rights of humanity, and until milder
punishments, and the abolition of the arbitrary power of opinion, shall afford security to
virtue and innocence when oppressed; and until tyranny shall be confined to the plains of
Asia, and Europe acknowledges the universal empire of reason, by which the interests of
sovereigns, and subjects, are best united.
This worry about the injustices of extradition gained increasing acceptance in the nineteenth century
and eventually led to an exception in extradition treaties excluding political offenders from
extradition in order to prevent the very kind of political vengeance that defined ancient extradition
practice. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, supra, at 149-50.
48. See Blakesley, supra note 45, at 51-52.
49. American courts, faced with the pervasive problem of fugitive criminals in the colonies,
quickly developed an expertise in the area. See CLARKE, supra note 36, at 28-29 (2d ed. 1874). The
Articles of Confederation, along with the U.S. Constitution, contained provisions requiring states to
deliver up fugitives charged with treason, felony or other crimes in another state. ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV; U.S. CONST. art. 4, 5 2.
50. For an analysis of the case of Jonathan Robbins, see Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionay
Martyrdom ofjonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229 (1990).
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beheading of Louis XVI, Great Britain declared war on France, a war that
would last for the next twenty-three years.5 1 Much of the war was fought
on the seas, and some major operations occurred off the American coast
in the British West Indies. 52 The H.M.S. Hermione was a British frigate
assigned to the West Indies, and it was led in 1797 by the talented but
cruel Captain Pigot. One day at sea, Pigot threatened to flog the last sailor
down from the topsails, and in the ensuing shuffle two sailors fell to their
deaths on the quarter-deck. Pigot's blunt response was to "throw the
lubbers overboard." 53 The next day, the crew mutinied, killing Pigot along
with nine other officers. 54 The mutinied crew then dispersed to various
destinations in order to escape punishment. One member of that crew was
Thomas Nash. In 1799, a man using the name Jonathan Robbins was
arrested in Charleston, South Carolina, and was accused of being Nash.55
Britain requested that Robbins be extradited to face punishment under
British law. American opinion was fiercely opposed to the extradition,
particularly when it was discovered that Robbins was an American citizen
who had been forcibly impressed into service on the Hermione. A federal
judge in South Carolina examined the extradition request, the applicable
treaty (the Jay Treaty of 1794), and the factual allegations, and concluded
that Robbins was subject to extradition.5 6 After the decision of the court,
Robbins was handed over to the British navy, which took him to Jamaica,
tried him by court-martial, and hanged him.57 The Robbins affair became
an important issue in the presidential election of 1800, which John Adams
lost, especially when it became public that Adams had instructed the judge
to deliver Robbins to the British.5 8
By the late 1800s, bilateral extradition treaties began to proliferate, and
since World War II, they have become so prevalent that the United States
alone has over one hundred treaties in force. 59 The broad outlines of the
51. See FRASER, supra note 40, at 479-506.
52. See ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, 2 THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE 210-11 (1902).
53. See 2 EDWARD BRENTON, NAVAL HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN 435-37 (London, C. Rice
1823).
54. 3 ISAAC SCHOMBERG, THE NAVAL CHRONOLOGY; OR, AN HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF
NAVAL AND MARITIME EVENTS 76 (London, T. Egerton 1815).
55. See Wedgwood, supra note 50, at 286-87.
56. See United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175).
57. See CLARKE, supra note 36, at 40.
58. This case also led to the first U.S. extradition statute, a legislative enactment intended to
constrain executive power and re-enforce the judicial nature of extradition decisions. See In re Mackin,
668 F.2d 122 (2d Cit. 1981); see also John Parry, supra note 28, at 108-14; Jacques Semmelman, Federal
Cours, the Constituion, and the Rule of Non-Inquit in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1198, 1207 (1991).
59. See BASSIOUNI, sipra note 36, at 24.
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law of extradition are now clear.60 Extradition occurs pursuant to a treaty,
rather than an informal exchange. A request is made to the executive of
another country for the extradition of an alleged criminal. This request
provides the grounds for the extradition, along with factual support for the
allegations. If the executive deems the request to be within the applicable
treaty, the judiciary then determines whether the individual is extraditable.
The judiciary will look at the allegations and the applicable treaty to ensure
that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the charge under the treaty. 61 Most
crimes are included within modern extradition treaties, although political
crimes are generally excluded. 62 If the judge finds that the evidence is
sufficient that the individual has committed a crime enumerated in the
applicable treaty, he will certify the proceedings to the executive, who is
ultimately authorized to effect the extradition. 63
One of the most striking occurrences in the history of extradition is that
whereas extradition began as a political phenomenon that largely excluded
common crimes, by the nineteenth century, the situation flip-flopped:
Extradition became a criminal phenomenon that largely excluded political
crimes. Most commentators explain the change as a product of two
revolutions, one ideological and the other material.
The French Revolution marked the beginning of a period of revolt
against the entrenched regimes in Western Europe. These despotic
regimes were seen by democrats as contrary to reason and natural law, and
political philosophers of the time, including Rousseau and Suarez,
theorized that the people were justified in overthrowing regimes that did
not represent the general will. The French Constitution of 1793 enshrined
these values by promising asylum to all those exiled from their home
countries "for the cause of liberty." 64 The political offense exception
gained rapid acceptance in Western Europe.65 This was a dangerous
doctrine. Conservative states across Europe trembled at the thought that
60. Extradition proceedings operate differently in different countries. What follows is a
description of widely applicable extradition procedures.
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
62. See L.F.E. Goldie, The 'Political Offense" Exception and Extradition Between Democratic States, 13
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 53 (1986).
63. See Note, Executive Discreion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313 (1962).
64. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 36, at 512.
65. By 1815, Sir James Mackintosh, the Scottish jurist and politician, went so far as to state in
Parliament:
I believe that I may venture to lay it down, if not as a part of the consuetudinary law of
nations, at least as agreeable to the usage of good times, that though nations may often
agree mutually to give up persons charged with the common offences against all human
society, civilized States afford an inviolable asylum to political emigrants.
SIR GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS, ON FOREIGN JURISDICTION AND THE EXTRADITION OF
CRIMINALS 46 (London, John W. Parker & Son 1859).
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citizens who rebelled against the established order could flee across the
border and receive protection, and states such as Austria and Prussia
fought hard to prevent the expansion of the doctrine of political asylum. 66
Despite their best efforts, however, the rise of democracy coincided with a
widespread acceptance of the political offense exception.
Common crimes, on the other hand, went from being largely exempt
from extradition to being the main focus of extradition treaties.67 This
development was connected inextricably with the Industrial Revolution. 68
The introduction of railways and long-distance steamships made
international travel a less daunting prospect for criminals.69 Suddenly,
national borders were hours, rather than days, distant.70 As a consequence
of the new technologies, "the conviction was forced upon the States of
[civilized] humanity that it was in their common interest to surrender
ordinary criminals regularly to each other."7 ' Extradition treaties began to
specify common crimes as harms subject to extradition. The Industrial
Revolution thus brought extensive changes to the way that states perceived
crimes, just as the French Revolution brought changes to the way they
viewed the purposes of government.
Before concluding this historical section, a few trends in extradition
practice since World War II should be noted. First, states have increasingly
opted to enter into multilateral, rather than bilateral, extradition treaties. 72
While bilateral treaties are still by far the most common of extradition
arrangements, a number of states that share geographic and political
similarities have entered into additional, supplemental, or superseding
multilateral agreements. The European Arrest Warrant is perhaps the most
well-known of these agreements, but other regional groups have also
adopted multilateral extradition treaties. 73
66. For example, when Switzerland refused to extradite a number of Piedmontese revolutionaries
to Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in 1828, Count Metternich persuaded Louis XVII to place troops on
the Swiss border. CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, ExTRADITION, POLITICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 80
(2001).
67. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 36, at 5.
68. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 36, at 504.
69. See SHEARER, uipra note 31, at 7-11.
70. As Benjamin Constant observed in 1802, "[e]xpatriation, which for the ancients was a
punishment, is easy for the moderns; and far from being painful to them, it is often quite agreeable."
BENJAMIN CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS 141 (Biancamaria Fontana ed., 1988).
71. See OPPENHEIM, spra note 36, at 504.
72. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 36, at 13-24.
73. See Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the United States of
America, June 25, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 10-201, 2003 O.J. (L 181) 27; Agreement on Mutual Legal
Assistance between the European Union and the United States of America, T.I.A.S. No. 10-201.1,
June 25, 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 181) 34; Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European
Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States, June 13, 2002, 2002 OJ. (L
190) 1; Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, 1752 U.N.T.S. 191; O.A.S.T.S.
No. 60; Benelux Extradition Convention, June 27, 1962, 616 U.N.T.S. 8893; Arab League
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Another important recent development is the rise of human rights
considerations in extradition law. Until recently, the rule of noninquiry
prevented the judiciary from inquiring into the fairness of the requesting
nation's justice system.74 As the Supreme Court articulated it, courts are
"bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial [in
the requesting state] will be fair."75 The rule of noninquiry, however, has
slowly been chipped away at by governments and courts in the post-World
War II period. The roots of this decay have been attributed by some to the
rise of human rights law during the same period.76 Just as states came to
recognize that individuals possessed rights separate and distinct from the
countries in which they found themselves, courts also came to recognize
that extradition involved interests beyond those of countries alone. Thus,
traditional ideas about comity and sovereignty gave way to a renewed
interest in fairness. In a landmark 1960 opinion, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held that there might be situations where a defendant "upon
extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic
to a federal court's sense of decency as to require reexamination of the
[rule of noninquiry]." 77 A number of other federal courts have spoken
approvingly of this exception to the rule.78 The war on terrorism has put
further strain on the rule of noninquiry, as the United States has sought
the extradition of terrorist suspects for trial by military commission. Some
countries object to the possibility that such suspects might be subject to
the death penalty in the United States, and a number of European
countries have demanded that the United States waive the death penalty as
a condition for extradition.7 9 The rule of noninquiry, born out of concern
Extradition Agreement, Sept. 14, 1952, 1952 B.F.S.P. 159, at 606, League of Arab States Treaty Series
27-32, reprinted in 8 REV. EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INT'L 328-32 (1952).
74. See Matthew Murchison, Extradition's Paradox: Duty, Discretion, and Rights in the World of Non-
Inquiry, 43 STAN.J. INT'L L. 295 (2007); see generally Semmelman, supra note 58.
75. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911).
76. See Semmelman, supra note 58, at 1214; see also William Magnuson, The Responsibility to Protect
and the Decline of Sovereignty: Free Speech Protection Under International Law, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
255 (2010).
77. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cit. 1960).
78. See In re Extradition of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1487 (7th Cit. 1984) (stating that an exception to
the rule of noninquiry might apply to "particularly atrocious [sic] procedures or punishments
employed by the foreign jurisdiction"); Prushinowski v. Samples, 734 F.2d 1016, 1019 (4th Cir. 1984)
(stating that the court might not extradite a defendant if "the prisons of a foreign country regularly
opened each day's proceedings with a hundred lashes applied to the back of each prisoner who did
not deny his or her God or conducted routine breakings on the wheel for every prisoner"); see also
Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103,
110-11 (1st Cir. 1997).
79. Indeed, the very foundation of U.S. efforts to prosecute terrorism suspects, the military
commission system, has drawn criticism as incompatible with modern standards of decency, and
some commentators have suggested that any suspect subject to trial by a military commission should
be exempt from extradition. See Alan Clarke, Terrorism, Extradiion, and the Death Penalty, 29 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 783, 784-808 (2003); James Finsten, Extradition or Execution, Policy Constraints in the
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for courtesy and friendship between governments, has given way to a new
concern for the rights of individuals.
It is impossible to give a full history of extradition in the limited space
available here, and this brief summary provides just a glance at the many
facets of extradition law over the centuries. It does, however, highlight the
ever-changing nature of extradition. The practice of extradition has
evolved from a relatively informal process that largely concerned
sovereigns, to a heavily legalized process that deals with thousands of
criminals a year. Certain concerns have been constant, such as the
punishment of wrongdoers wherever they may be found, the importance
of maintaining friendly relations between countries, and the relative
importance of individual rights. Regardless, international extradition law is
a deeply complicated phenomenon that defies easy explanation. In order
to better understand this phenomenon, the next Part discusses the
structure of extradition treaties, that is, the forms and framework under
which extradition takes place.so
II. THE STRUCTURE OF EXTRADITION TREATIES
How do we explain the curious structure of international extradition
treaties? There are many aspects of extradition law today that, on closer
inspection, are strikingly counter-intuitive, depending on one's conception
of international law. In particular, this Article is interested in three aspects
of the structure of extradition law: First, why do states enter into formal
extradition treaties at all, rather than using informal "soft" law
commitments; second, why do states overwhelmingly enter into bilateral
rather than multilateral extradition agreements; and third, why do states
generally leave the ultimate decision whether to extradite to the executive
branches, rather than the judiciary? All of these are difficult questions, and
ones that are not easily soluble. A close look at domestic politics may,
however, begin to untangle the difficulties.
A. Hard Versus Soft Law
Why do states use international treaties, rather than informal
understandings, as the primary means of securing the extradition of
United States' War on Terror, S. CAL. L. REV. 835 (2004); Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United
States Involvement in the International Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 813,
882-84 (1993); Gareth Peirce, America's Non-Compliance: Gareth Peirce Presents the Case Against
Extradition, LONDON REV. BOOKS, May 13, 2010, at 18, 19-22.
80. Here, treaty structure is distinguished from treaty substance, which refers to the
considerations that enter into a determination of extraditibility. The distinction between structure and
substance, although commonly used, may not be so clear as it appears. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN,
HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 130-32 (2008).
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individuals from foreign states?8 1 It is not entirely obvious that states could
not satisfy many or all of their interests in extradition through evolved
patterns of informal cooperation, as opposed to treaty negotiations.
Informal understandings and customary usages often form the basis of
international relations. 82 Some commentators have even suggested that, in
this era of complicated and intractable international disputes, nonbinding
"soft" law might be more effective than formal treaties. 83 Why, then, have
states opted to entrust extradition almost entirely to treaty-based
relations?84
International law scholars have spent considerable effort attempting to
answer the question of why states choose to enter into binding
international treaties rather than nonbinding understandings. One
particularly influential methodology is the rational choice institutionalist
approach.8 5 The basic assumptions underlying institutionalist theories of
81. Extradition in the absence of a treaty is a rare, although not unheard of, occurrence. See
SHEARER, supra note 31, at 27-34.
82. See Anthony Aust, The Theog and Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 787, 788-89 (1986); Alan Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationshp of Treaties and Soft Law,
48 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 901, 903-04 (1999); Charles Lipson, W/y Are Some InternationalAgreements
Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495 (1991).
83. Richard N. Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, recently stated that
"[i]n this era of international relations, we may need to start thinking less about formal international
treaties and agreements and much more about what you might describe as coordinated national
policies." Bernard Gwertzman, The New '7nformal" Multilateral Era, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/publication/20275.
84. But see Eric A. Posner, InternationalLaw and the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 797,
823 (2005) (noting that "in its dealings with states with weaker governments and law enforcement
systems, the United States has maintained its policy of crossborder kidnappings as well as
assassinations in some instances, despite their questionable international legality").
85. See, e.g., GUZMAN, supra note 80; Kenneth W. Abbott, Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism
for the Study of International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 10 (2008); Andrew T. Guzman, A Complance-
Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823 (2002); Andrew T. Guzman, International
Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2008); Christian Kirchner, The Power of
Rational Choice Methodology in Guiding the Analysis and the Design of Public International Law Institutions, 2008
U. ILL. L. REv. 419 (2008); Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implcations for
International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SC. REV. 923, 923 (1985); Duncan Snidal, Rational
Choice and International Relations, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 73, 74-76 (Walter
Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002); Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,
36 INT'L ORG. 299, 311-16 (1982). Institutionalism is often contrasted with liberalism. For examples
of the liberal approach, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, InternationalAgreements: A Rational
Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 113 (2003); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theog of
Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(2002); Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theof of International Politics, 51 INT'L
ORG. 513, 514 (1997); Eric A. Posner, International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 797 (2005); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2005); John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379 (1982). Constructivist theories, on the
other hand, provide a non-rational choice approach to international law. See Harold Hongju Koh,
The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, Address at the Third Annual Houston
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international law is that states are the unit of interest in international law,
and that they are unitary, self-interested, and rational.86 Unitary, in this
instance, means that the model need not take into account domestic
politics or fractious interest groups within the state. The state, in other
words, is a "black box" and can be understood without reference to
groups inside domestic borders.8 7 States are rational in that they adopt
policies that are aptly suited to achieving the state's goals.88 States are self-
interested in that they strategically pursue some combination of security,
national wealth, and citizen well-being.89 Although institutionalist theories
do not require the assumption that state interests are always self-
regarding,90 most institutionalist theorists of international law do not take
seriously the proposition that states act altruistically.9'
Institutionalist theories of international law have much to say on why
states enter into treaties. Andrew Guzman, for example, argues that
treaties are a form of contract. 92 Applying well-established theories of
contract formation, Guzman demonstrates that parties will enter into an
agreement when doing so is advantageous for both parties. More
specifically, the Coase theorem holds that, in the absence of transaction
costs, parties will enter into contracts that maximize joint gains. 9" Contract
theory generally assumes that when an agreement is reached, the parties
will memorialize that agreement in the form of a legally binding contract.
By providing that an agreement will be enforceable in court, parties can
ensure that the agreement's obligations will be performed unless the joint
cost of performance is greater than the joint benefit. The legally binding
contract can be brought to court in the event of breach by one party, and
the court will enforce the contract's terms, either by awarding damages to
the injured party or by forcing the party to perform its obligations. Much
Law Review Lecture Series Frankel Lecture in International Law (Apr. 8, 1998), in 35 HOUS. L. REV.
623 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, The 'Haidi Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Poliy, 103 YALE
L.J. 2391, 2405-09 (1994); Harold Hongju Koh, Refugees, the Courts, and the New World Order, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 999 (1994); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181
(1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litgation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2398-2402
(1991); Andrew T.F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist
Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 81 (2006).
86. Abbott, supra note 85, at 10-11.
87. Id.
88. Some models of rational choice theory acknowledge that states exhibit "bounded rationality,"
a concept understood as rationality within a set of methodological constraints. See Snidal, Rational
Choice and International Relations, supra note 85, at 74-76.
89. See Posner, supra note 85, at 798.
90. See Snidal, Rational Choice and International Relations, supra note 85, at 74-76.
91. Id. at 82-85.
92. See GUzMAN, supra note 80, at 130-32; Andrew Guzman, The Design ofInternationalAgreements,
16 EUR.J. INT'L L. 579, 585 (2005).
93. NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 110 (2d ed.
2006).
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of the value of a contract, then, lies in its enforceability, which allows
parties to rely on past commitments and encourages the formation of
mutually beneficial agreements. 94
Unlike contract law, however, international law cannot rely on a court
of general jurisdiction that can interpret agreements, determine whether a
breach has occurred, and enforce damage awards.95 There is no
international police force that can confiscate state property if a state
refuses to pay damages. The essential feature of international law, thus, is
its weak level of enforceability. 96 This is a major problem for states, if, as
mentioned above, the value of a contract lies to a great extent in its
binding nature. The question naturally arises why states enter into treaties
at all if the treaties have little or no way of being enforced. Guzman
believes that the answer lies in the concept of credibility.
According to Guzman, states have much to gain from being able to
make credible commitments to other states. Through cooperation, states
can overcome certain enduring problems of international politics, such as
the prisoner's dilemma and the tragedy of the commons. Thus, states have
an interest in being able to make enforceable agreements in order to
facilitate cooperation. Until there is a supranational authority on par with
domestic authorities, however, states will never be able to make their
agreements enforceable in the way that domestic contracts are. Instead,
states attempt, in some but not all cases, to increase the credibility of their
commitments. Instead of relying on a court to enforce damage awards,
states punish breaches of agreements through two kinds of sanctions:
direct and reputational. Direct sanctions are explicit punishments for the
violation of an agreement. Reputational sanctions are those costs that a
state incurs by signaling that it does not take its commitments seriously.97
So, if the United States breaks an international arms reduction treaty, it
may need to worry that the other parties to the agreement will impose
direct sanctions in the form of frozen assets, import and export
restrictions, or even military force. But such direct sanctions are rare in
international law.98 More important are reputational sanctions.9 9 Other
countries, seeing that the United States has breached its agreement, might
94. See Guzman, supra note 92, at 585-87.
95. In the realm of international trade, the dispute settlement body fulfills many of these
functions. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND
JURISPRUDENCE (1998); THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003 (Federico Ortino &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004); William Magnuson, WITO Jurisprudence and Its Critiques: The
Appellate Body's Anironstitutional Resistance, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 121 (2010).
96. See Guzman, supra note 92, at 588-89.
97. Id. at 595-96; see also Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theog ofInternational Law, supra note 85.
98. See Guzman, spra note 92, at 595-96.
99. For a discussion of the complicated role that reputation plays in international law, see Rachel
Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 231 (2009).
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become more wary of entering into an agreement with the United States if
they believe that the United States is a country that rarely honors its
commitments. The United States would then lose out on the many
benefits of international cooperation. Even if it succeeds in entering into
future agreements, the added risk that other states perceive in dealing with
it may force it into less favorable agreements. 100
Guzman's conclusion is that there may be situations in which a state is
better off opting for a nonbinding agreement rather than a treaty. This
conclusion stems from his observation that entering into a treaty increases
the potential harm from breach. Countries, thus, might opt for nonbinding
agreements in cases when the parties would abide by their commitments
even in the absence of a treaty, or if the parties would violate their
commitments even in the presence of a treaty. A country will decide to
enter into a treaty, on the other hand, when the added compliance pull of
reputational sanctions will make the difference between compliance and
breach.10' In other words, countries will enter into treaties only when they
expect that the presence of a treaty will affect future behavior in a
significant way.
Guzman identifies several other implications of his model. First, states
will be especially likely to use credibility-enhancing mechanisms (such as
signing a treaty) where the issues involved are low-stakes. This is so
because "where the compliance decision of states is likely to be influenced
by reputational issues, the use of credibility-enhancing devices is more
likely."1 02 For example, if a state is threatened with extinction, it is unlikely
that it will be worried about the reputational sanctions of breaching an
agreement. If, on the other hand, the issue is not central to a state's
interest, the state will be more likely to comply with an adverse obligation
in order to preserve a reputation for law-abidingness, a reputation that may
later lead to future gains.103 A second implication of this model is that
treaties, rather than understandings, will be entered into when the
likelihood of violation is low. As Guzman explains, sanctions are costly
and cause a net loss to parties. The more likely it is that a violation will
occur, the higher the expected cost of breach will be. 104
The advantage of a treaty, then, is that it increases the credibility of a
country's commitment. If the advantages of increased credibility outweigh
the potentially higher costs associated with breach, states will choose to
enter into a formal treaty, rather than leave cooperation to informal
understandings or ad hoc agreements.
100. See Guzman, supra note 92, at 596.
101. Id. at 597.
102. Id. at 605.
103. See id. at 605-06.
104. Id.
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Guzman's rational choice institutionalist theory of why states enter into
international treaties suggests that the design of extradition agreements
should be analyzed by looking at the relevant costs and benefits to states
of treaty, as opposed to soft law, arrangements. More specifically, he
identifies these costs and benefits as being the increased likelihood of
compliance weighed against the increased reputational harm in the case of
breach. If a country is likely to comply with an extradition request, or
refuse to comply, regardless of the presence of a treaty, then states will
likely choose not to enter into a treaty at all. To do so would increase
reputational harm to the breaching state, a clear loss, without any
concomitant gain in cooperation rates. If a state does decide to enter into
an extradition treaty with another state, Guzman would likely conclude
that the two states believe that the treaty will help facilitate the arrest and
rendition of criminals. It might also signal that the state parties believe that
extradition is an issue of sufficiently low importance that reputational risks
could deter any potential violations of the treaty. In other words, the
possibility of harm to a country's reputation for law-abidingness would
outweigh any advantages that the state could receive by refusing to honor
an extradition request. So, for example, a country might desire to protect a
wealthy or influential individual who is sought by another country, but that
country might also realize that doing so would do serious harm to its
reputation on the international stage. If the country's desire to protect, or
at least not affirmatively track down and arrest, alleged criminals is not
sufficiently central to the country's interests, then the country might be
more willing to enter into extradition treaties.
The other possibility that Guzman foresees is that the decision to
negotiate a treaty will be affected by expected compliance rates. If a
country believes that violations will be infrequent, then it may be more
willing to enter into a binding commitment to extradite. After all, as
expected reputational costs of a treaty decrease (due to low possibilities of
violation), the overall value of a treaty increases. The inverse relationship
between expected violation rates and treaty value suggests that extradition
treaties will be entered into when a country expects to be able to fulfill its
obligations under the treaty. In other words, we can conclude that a state
will enter into an extradition treaty when it is committed to complying
with the requesting state's extradition demands.
Despite the appealing simplicity of Guzman's design model, the model
leads to some problematic conclusions about when we would expect states
to enter into extradition treaties. First, do states truly enter into treaties
only when the issues are "low-stakes"? While it may be true that there is a
certain category of topics that are so central to a state's interests as to be
anathema to treaty negotiations, the list of such topics must be short. A
state's interest in its own survival, the maintenance of its government, and
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the protection of its citizens might enter into that list, but few others
would. In fact, even the ability of a state to protect its citizens as it sees fit
has been restricted by international treaties. 0 5 More importantly, treaty
negotiations are costly to domestic actors and the state as a whole, both in
time and in resources. If an issue is not sufficiently important to a state's
interests, a state will not decide to incur these costs. Given transaction
costs, we might conclude that a state will only enter into a treaty when the
issues at play are high-stakes, not low-stakes. This conclusion is supported
by evidence of the way in which the United States has used extradition
treaties since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Bush and
Obama Administrations have made the identification and arrest of
terrorism suspects, whether domestically or abroad, one of their primary
national security goals.10 6 Extradition is one tool through which the United
States effectuates this policy. The rise in the importance of extradition has
led, not to reduced efforts to conclude extradition treaties, but rather to
increased efforts. 107 It might be that the United States concluded these
treaties in spite of, rather than because of, the renewed importance of
extradition in the post-9/11 world, but it seems plausible that the
importance of extradition instead contributed to their completion. If we
believe that government decision-makers respond to public opinion, then
this conclusion makes sense. As the public became increasingly concerned
with international terrorism, the incentives of elected officials to appear
"tough on terror" increased.
Guzman's reliance on reputation as an important factor in the decision
whether to enter into treaties is also misplaced when we examine the role
of domestic politics in determining state behavior. As Rachel Brewster has
argued, there are serious questions about whether states consider
reputation as a significant constraint on behavior. 0 8 When we look at the
incentives of individual actors within the state, a state's reputation for law-
abidingness would appear to be relatively unimportant in many instances.
In democratic (and, to a lesser degree, nondemocratic) countries, leaders
and governments come and go. If violating a treaty provides immediate
benefits to a leader, he may weigh that interest more heavily than the long-
105. For example, the WTO treaty has established strict limits on a state's right to protect its
citizens from the introduction of pathogens. See Appellate Body Report, Australia - Measures Affetng
Importaion of Salmon (Australia- Salmon), 125, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998); Appellate Body
Report, European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
106. See Elizabeth Burleson, Juvenile Execution, Terrorist Extradition, and Supreme Court Discretion to
Consider International Death Penaly juripmdence, 68 ALB. L. REv. 909, 911 (2005); Christopher C.
Joyner, International Extradition and Global Terrorism: Bringing International Criminals to jusice, 25 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 493 (2003).
107. See Increased Extraditions to United States, With Record Number From Mexco; Some Extraditions
From United Kingdom Face Defficuly, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 124 (2010).
108. See Brewster, supra note 99.
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term cost of breaking the treaty. After all, he may only be in power for a
short time, and he will be able to extract the value now. And even if he
does violate the terms of a treaty, it is not clear that the country as a whole
will develop a "bad" reputation. Future leaders will likely disclaim the acts
of the past government and argue that they, unlike past leaders, are law-
abiding. The immediate and visible change in international attitudes
towards the United States after President Obama's inauguration is
evidence of the fact that a country's reputation depends to a great extent
on its current president.109
A second complication that Brewster highlights concerns the
informational content of a reputation.110 Presumably, states develop
reputations for law-abidingness because other states believe that past
behavior correlates with future behavior. But what reliable conclusions can
other states draw from a country's breach of a treaty? The violation of an
environmental treaty may not be a helpful predictor of a state's
commitment to its treaties in the areas of security or trade. Reputations
may, therefore, be specific to issue area. Furthermore, treaty violations may
be more intimately connected to changes in domestic and international
interests than to past compliance. As Brewster explains:
[T]he likelihood that the United States will comply with future arms
control agreements depends far more on the strategic situation of
the moment (for example, the present threat from international
terrorist groups) than whether it complied with the ABM Treaty in
very different political contexts in the past (for example, during the
Cold War)."1
We might also add that the likelihood of compliance will heavily depend
on the sometimes conflicting interests and fluctuating power of domestic
institutions, including the Pentagon and the State Department. Therefore,
for a number of reasons, past behavior may not be predictive of future
behavior, belying the claim that reputation strongly influences state
behavior.
Additionally, and perhaps most fundamentally, institutionalist scholars,
when pushed, have to look within the state to examine the interests and
incentives of domestic actors in order to defend their assertions about
state behavior. Reputation may be important in international law, but to
fully understand its role in influencing state action, we have to understand
who the relevant actors are. If governments do not have the same interests
as the state as a whole, then we may observe behavior that does not fully
109. See, e.g., Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jul.
23, 2009), http://tinyurl.com/laa9d6.
110. Brewster, supra note 99, at 233.
111. Id..
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align with institutionalist theories that assume the state is a "black box."
Traditional rational choice institutionalist theory, then, must either
succumb to these failings or relinquish its claim that states should be
treated as unitary actors.
A better explanation of why states enter into extradition treaties, then,
must examine the incentives of domestic institutions and decision-makers.
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have addressed this question with regard
to international law in general, and their analysis may be useful here. 112
Like Guzman, they argue that international law exerts no moral or
normative pull on states.113 At the same time, they recognize that treaties
are abundant in the modern world, and they attempt to explain this
phenomenon through game theory. Goldsmith and Posner show that
states can achieve joint gains through cooperation or coordination in many
situations.114 By agreeing not to attack fishing vessels, or by promising to
reduce nuclear arsenals, states can improve their country's welfare and
security. Law, they argue, plays no necessary role in this process. What is
necessary, however, is for states to know which actions count as
cooperation and coordination.1 5 By communicating about how to
cooperate (i.e., how much to reduce nuclear weapon stockpiles, or how to
verify compliance), states can more effectively and reliably reach their
optimal payoffs. Treaties can be a useful way for states to communicate
with each other in international affairs. 116 A treaty clarifies expectations
about other states' moves.
If treaties are just another form of communication, why would states
not choose a less expensive version of communicating a message, either
through diplomats or through informal meetings? International treaties
have a number of inherent advantages over informal agreements. First,
because legislative consent is a condition for national ratification of treaties
in most nations, the very process of ratification will inevitably reveal
important information about the country's attitude toward the agreement,
as well as the likelihood of compliance.117 When a treaty goes through
hearings, expert testimony, public discussions, and amendments, the world
learns a tremendous amount about the state's interests - or payoffs, in
game theory terms. Just as importantly, the fact that the president has sent
a treaty to Congress sends a message about the seriousness of the
president's commitment to the treaty. By submitting the treaty to
ratification, the president incurs certain costs (in foregoing other priorities,
112. See Goldsmith & Posner, InternaionalAgreements: A Rational Choice Approach, supra note 85.
113. See Goldsmith & Posner, A Theory ofCustomary InternaionalLaw, supra note 85.
114. Id. at 116-18.
115. Id. at 117.
116. Id. at 118.
117. Id. at 122-28.
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in resources spent on defending the agreement, etc.)." 8 Thus, the decision
to choose a formal international treaty, rather than an informal agreement,
is a credible signal from a country about the seriousness of its commitment
to the agreement.
In this sense, the choice between formal and informal agreements tracks
the seriousness of a state's commitment to an agreement. If a state decides
to go through the effort of negotiating and ratifying a formal treaty, it is
communicating to other states that it is likely to comply with the treaty. If
a state decides to use an informal agreement, the state communicates to
other states that it views the agreement less seriously. In Goldsmith and
Posner's view, legalization of an international agreement serves as a means
of conveying the seriousness of a state's intent to be bound, similar to the
way that signing a contract in domestic law conveys a greater level of
commitment.
Domestic institutions are not just tools for government decision-
makers, however. The preferences of government decision-makers are
themselves influenced critically by the domestic and transnational
environment in which they operate.U9 Nonstate actors, such as
corporations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), shape the
social purposes that underlie state preferences, and those state preferences
in turn determine state behavior.120
Domestic politics and institutions, thus, can play an important role in
creating a demand for treaty-based arrangements. Kal Raustiala, for
example, argues that individuals and private groups use the state as a
means of pursuing their interests, both domestically and internationally.121
The interplay of these interests, aggregated at the level of the state,
ultimately determines state behavior. Domestic preferences and domestic
institutions interact to affect the structure of international agreements.
According to Raustiala, domestic pressure for international cooperation,
where it exists, will inevitably be skewed in favor of binding treaties, rather
than nonbinding "pledges."122 This systematic preference for treaties is
based on the widespread belief that pledges are "weak, ineffective, and
inferior" to treaties.123 It is unimportant whether treaties actually do lead to
higher rates of compliance; what matters is that domestic groups think
they do.
This perception, however, does not mean that states will always prefer
treaties over pledges. First, there is no guarantee that the aggregated
118. Id. at 124-25.
119. See Moravesik, supra note 85, at 516.
120. Id.
121. Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in InternationalAgreemnents, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581, 595 (2005)
122. Id. at 596.
123. Id.
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preferences of a society will be in favor of cooperation. It might be that
the interplay of domestic factions leads to a preference for a somewhat
weaker commitment in the form of a pledge. Second, domestic institutions
may tip the balance as well.124 In most states, treaties require a more
stringent ratification process than informal understandings. For example,
in the United States, treaties must be affirmed by two-thirds of the Senate,
whereas informal understandings need undergo no legislative consent
process.125 Thus, officials in the executive branch will often prefer pledges
to treaties if they are worried about high transaction costs. Pledges also
serve to insulate governments from domestic political pressures because
pledges are less "prominent" and visible to the public.126 At the same time,
treaties may serve a useful purpose to government officials who want to
signal credibility. A state that enters into a treaty, with all the institutional
requirements necessary for ratification, demonstrates that it has strong
domestic support for compliance with that treaty. Ex ante, this credibility
may be useful to government officials because it can reassure other states
that the commitments will be honored. Ex post, of course, it may lead to
lower flexibility in a state's decision whether or how to comply with its
international obligations, because treaties generally will set out with more
specificity the precise undertakings that a state is making.127 It should be
remembered, though, that government officials often have short time
horizons and thus may be less concerned about long-term
consequences.128
Raustiala's liberal model of state decision-making suggests very different
places to look when attempting to answer why states opt to structure their
extradition proceedings through treaties. Instead of focusing on the
benefits to states of high compliance and the costs of potentially greater
reputational harm, as institutionalist scholars would have us do, Raustiala's
theory asserts that we must examine the perspectives and opinions of
domestic actors, including both civil society groups and government
officials. If states enter into formal extradition treaties, rather than
informal pledges, this is owing to the complex interplay of perceived (and
not necessarily objective or rational) perspectives of individuals and groups
124. Id. at 597-98.
125. For discussions of the legal requirements regarding international agreements in the United
States, see Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007);
Michael D. Ramsey, ExecutdveAgreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 134 (1998); PeterJ.
Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEx. L. REV. 961 (2001); John C. Yoo,
Laws as Treaties?: The Consitutionality of Congressional-Executive Ageements, 99 MICH. L. REv. 757, 790
(2001).
126. Raustiala, supra note 121, at 597.
127. This may not be the case in all treaties. Some treaties, such as many human rights treaties,
contain only vague commitments from states. This is a kind of soft law, somewhere between a treaty
and an understanding.
128. See Brewster, supra note 99, at 254.
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within the state. An even casual perusal of extradition arrangements today
demonstrates that treaties are the dominant form of cooperation, an
observation that would appear to show that domestic groups are strongly
in favor of cooperating to find, arrest, and deliver criminals internationally.
This may be explained by the powerful pull of law and order as a political
tactic. It may also be explained by the perceived interests of government
officials within foreign ministries and ministries of justice. Regardless of
whether extradition treaties actually do lead to more cooperation in
extradition affairs, many groups appear to believe that they do.
An important point here is that domestic preferences for or against
extradition treaties may not be entirely coherent, either within a state or
through time. Some groups within a state may favor cooperation with
foreign states in criminal affairs, while other groups within the same state
may declaim any such cooperation as foreign meddling. Often, the public's
reaction to extradition requests depends on who the requesting state is.
Domestic groups generally favor the return of individuals who have
escaped their country and fled to another. But domestic preferences for
foreign cooperation drop off significantly when the request is made on
one's own state. For example, when it was discovered that Pakistani
nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan had passed sensitive nuclear
technology to Iran and North Korea, domestic groups in the United States
were strongly in favor of requesting that Pakistan deliver him to U.S.
authorities.129 Pakistani newspapers, on the other hand, ran editorials with
titles such as "Do Not Extradite Him, They Are Murderers," demanding
that the Pakistani government refuse any extradition request from the
United States.130 Of course, extradition treaties generally contain mutual
obligations, requiring both state parties to render up criminals of certain
types. Thus, there is no option to sign a treaty that only allows for
extradition requests by one country. The obligations will always bind both
parties.
A state's aggregated preferences for extradition treaties may depend,
then, on whether it foresees being primarily a requesting state or a
requested state. If domestic groups expect to make a large number of
requests on another state (either because a large number of criminals
escape there or because a criminal group resides there permanently),131 it
might be more willing to enter into an extradition treaty. For example, the
129. See Syed Mohsin Naqvi, Thousands Rally Against Musharraf CNN.COM, (Mar. 20, 2005),
http://tinyurl.com/c73gyxj.
130. See Nuclear Prisoner, NEWSCIENTIST, Sept. 3, 2005, at 5; BBC Monitoring International
Reports, Saudi Press Selection List, BBC (June 17, 2006), http://wvy.monitor.bbc.co.uk.
131. This may be the case for countries that are known to have terrorist cells residing within their
borders.
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United States makes many more extradition requests than it receives. 132
The United States, then, relies more heavily on extradition treaties than its
treaty partners do. Assuming that the intensity of extradition requests are
related to a state's interest in extradition, the United States probably has a
strong preference for extradition treaties.
The use of treaties, as opposed to soft law, may also reflect a decision to
harness the institutional competences of courts. Treaties must be
interpreted by courts, while soft law generally is not judicially enforceable.
Judicial decision-making in extradition may be advantageous for a number
of reasons. First, courts may be seen as increasing the probability of
compliance, an advantage for countries worried about cheating. Second,
delegating decision-making to courts reduces pressure on the political
branches and insulates them from public criticism. Third, courts may be
more skilled at interpreting treaties than the political branches, and thus
may produce more consistent results.
Domestic actors may also use international treaties as an alternative
forum for pursuing domestic policy aims that are frustrated by local
structures. 133 When domestic interest groups cannot achieve their goals
through domestic legislation, they may at times use international
agreements as a substitute. Thus, there is some evidence that a number of
countries with weak, overburdened, or affirmatively corrupt criminal
justice systems use extradition arrangements with other countries as a
criminal law enforcement tactic.134 Israel, for example, has in recent years
reached out to the United States to help prosecute Israeli crime bosses.
Colombia and Mexico have similar arrangements and often allow their
own citizens to be extradited to the United States for prosecution,
highlighting the struggles that domestic law enforcement and judicial
institutions face in effectively prosecuting criminal organizations. 135 These
difficulties may stem from structural problems, such as the lack of
expertise by domestic institutions, but they may also stem from
sociological issues, such as the reluctance of witnesses to testify against
powerful local figures without strong witness protection programs. Where
local circumstances make domestic prosecution of certain groups difficult,
132. In 2002, the United States successfully received the extradition of 269 individuals from
foreign countries, while it itself extradited only 102 fugitives to foreign countries. See Ashley Wright
Baker, Forible TransborderAbduction: Defensive Versus Offensive Remedies forAlvareg-Machain, 49 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 1373, 1411 n.228 (2004).
133. See Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 501
(2004) (discussing the ways in which international agreements can influence domestic policy).
134. See Marc Perelman, Israel Seeks U.S. Heo to Fight Mob Crime Wave, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD,
(Oct. 16, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/cxd4f3b ("The extradition would allow the boss to be prosecuted
in American courts rather than Israeli ones - a shift that Israeli authorities have encouraged. It is the
second such request in two years."); see also Edward M. Morgan, Traffic Circles: The Legal Logic of Drug
Extraditions, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 373, 374-75 (2009).
135. Morgan, supra note 134.
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extradition treaties serve as a useful means for satisfying the interests of
domestic actors in prosecution.
One factor that we must keep in mind when analyzing why a state
enters into an extradition treaty is what other alternatives the state has that
might serve to satisfy its interests. If the ultimate interest is the return of
criminals for prosecution, a country has a number of alternatives to
executing a treaty. It can attempt to negotiate an ad hoc agreement with
the foreign state related specifically to the criminals at issue. For example,
in 1864, the United States extradited a former governor of Cuba at the
request of Spain in the absence of an extradition treaty, after it was alleged
that the governor had unlawfully sold over one hundred Africans into
slavery.136 Or a state can try to locate the individual on its own, bypassing
cooperation with the other state, and bring him to justice.137 This occurred
in the well-known case of Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national who was
suspected by the United States of being involved in the torture and murder
of a Drug Enforcement Agent.138 Although the United States had an
extradition treaty with Mexico, it decided, perhaps because of doubts
about Mexican cooperation, to operate outside of the treaty in order to put
Alvarez on trial. In 1992, Alvarez was kidnapped by masked gunmen in
Guadalajara and flown to Texas for arrest.139 The U.S. Supreme Court
would later hold that Alvarez's abduction did not violate the extradition
treaty because the treaty did not address forcible abductions.140 The U.S.
raid into Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden, which aimed to capture
him in the absence of resistance, would also fall within this category, as
Pakistani authorities were unaware of the operation before it occurred.141
136. This case has been described as provoking more discussion than any other in the history of
extradition in the United States, due to its occurrence in the absence of an extradition treaty. See 2
ROLAND FOULKE, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 n.9 (1920); MOORE, supra note 39, at
33-35.
137. See Michael H. Cardozo, Note and Comment, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the
Solution?, 55 AM.J. INT'L L. 127 (1961); D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trialin the
United States: Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1, 29-30 (1988); G. Gregory
Schuetz, Comment, Apprehending Terrorists Overseas Under United States and International Law: A Case
Study of the Fawaz Younis Arrest, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 499 (1988).
138. See William C. Aceves, The Legality of Transborder Abductions: A Study of United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 3 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 101 (1996); Posner, supra note 84, at 822-23 (analysis of
this case using a choice domestic politics approach).
139. Aceves, supra note 138, at 107-08.
140. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664-65 (1992). The decision sparked
outrage in both Mexico and the United States. See Editorial Desk, Kidnap? Sure, Says The Court, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 1992, at A26 ("The Supreme Court's astonishing Mexican extradition decision
upholds national power at the expense of national honor."); David C. Scott, U.S. Court Ruling Provokes
Heated Mexican Retort, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 17, 1992, at 1 ("Mexico responded
angrily ... by issuing a blanket ban on activities of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents in Mexico.").
141. See Mark Landler & Helene Cooper, New U.S. Account in Bin Laden Raid: He Was Unarmed,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011, at Al (Some commentators have, however, asserted that the operation had
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A third option, located somewhere between ad hoc agreements and
forcible abduction without the consent of the other state, is what is known
as "extraordinary rendition." 142 Extraordinary rendition generally refers to
the practice of the United States after 9/11 of forcibly abducting terrorism
suspects in foreign countries, through murky cooperation with elements of
the foreign government, and delivering the suspects to locations outside of
the reach of U.S. judicial review.143 Extraordinary renditions take place
under veils of immense secrecy, but evidence of their occurrence has
nonetheless seeped out. In 2003, for example, the radical Islamic cleric
Abu Omar was abducted on his way to a mosque in Milan, Italy, by CIA
agents and flown to Egypt, where he was interrogated and tortured for
information related to terrorist activities."' Although Italian authorities
have denied knowing about or acquiescing in Omar's abduction, other
sources have acknowledged such ties.145 It is widely suspected that Italy's
intelligence service, SISMI, cooperated with their American counterparts
in the raid.146
These three alternatives to extradition treaties (ad hoc agreement, secret
abduction, and extraordinary rendition) provide states with a variety of
options when deciding how they might satisfy their interest in securing the
return of criminals from foreign states. They have the advantage of not
requiring the lengthy and potentially costly process of treaty negotiation,
and they may give government decision-makers more flexibility in future
transactions. After all, there is no requirement of mutuality or judicial
consent when conducting an extraordinary rendition. But these alternatives
also come at a cost. The cost of negotiating for the return of potentially
hundreds of individuals every year would weigh heavily on all involved
actors, a daunting task even for a country such as the United States that
has vast governmental capacities. And the invasion of a country's
sovereign territory is always a risky venture. Just as importantly, the
abduction or extraordinary rendition of suspected criminals from foreign
states can create large political costs for both countries, especially if such
transactions are not subject to traditional constraints of probable cause or
judicial review. The Abu Omar case, for example, was damaging both for
no intention to capture bin Laden alive.); Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden, NEW YORKER, Aug.
8, 2011, at 34-45.
142. See generally David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinay Rendition: A Human Rights
Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 124-25 (2006); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist,
Extraordinay Rendition and the Humanitarian Law of War and Occupation, 47 VA.]. INT'L L. 295 (2007).
143. Louis Fisher, Extraordinay Rendition: The Price ofSecreg, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1416 (2008).
144. Craig Whitlock, CIA Ruse Is Said To Have Damaged Probe in Milan; Itay Alegedy Misled on
Cleric'sAbduction, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,2005, at Al.
145. Colleen Barry, judge: Italy Probably Knew of CIA lidnapping, STAR LEDGER, Feb. 2, 2010, at 26.
146. See Secreg on CIA Cleric Snatch Criicied, ANSA MEDIA SERVICE (Feb. 1, 2010),
http://dnyurl.com/6s4d9ff.
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Silvio Berlusconi, Italy's prime minister, and George Bush, let alone the
careers of the agents involved in planning the abduction. Government
officials, thus, may prefer to have the political cover that an extradition
treaty provides to prevent the kind of media backlash that the more ad hoc
and secret renditions have caused. This preference may be rooted in a
deeper preference within the public at large for open and lawful
government actions.
B. Bilateral Versus Multilateral Treaties
Once a state has decided that it has an interest in negotiating an
extradition treaty, it must then decide the next question: With whom?
Should it negotiate a single treaty will all states of the world? Should it
negotiate bilateral treaties with individual states? Or should it instead
attempt to reach agreements with some subset of all states, based either on
geographical closeness, ideological similarities, or some other factor?
As an empirical matter, states have demonstrated by their actions a
strong preference for bilateral extradition treaties. The United States alone
has more than one hundred treaties in force with other states. 147 At first
glance, it appears quite illogical for states to negotiate individual bilateral
extradition treaties with other states. The costs of negotiating the countless
treaties are high. The complexity of understanding the different provisions
of different treaties is overwhelming. And the mere fact that an individual
is located in one country, rather than another, may affect a state's ability to
arrest the individual. This is a perverse result for states that desire a
predictable and consistent method for securing the return of criminals to
justice.
Adding to the mystery is the general consensus that extradition is a
problem that requires collective action. As Beccaria observed as early as
1764, "the conviction of finding nowhere a span of earth where real crimes
were pardoned might be the most efficacious way of preventing their
occurrence." 148 In other words, if a state has an extradition treaty with
most, but not all states, then a fugitive can always decide to travel to the
excluded states in order to escape the reach of justice. Thus, the value of
extradition treaties lies to a great extent in their ability to ensure that the
state's jurisdiction is inescapable. Criminality is a problem that requires
collective action, just as environmental pollution and world trade do. 149
147. BASSIOUNI, supra note 36, at 24.
148. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 47, at 194.
149. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1965); William J. Aceves, Instituldonalist Theory and InternationalLegal Scholarsho, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 227 (1997); R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSoial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy oftbe Commons, 162 SC. 1243 (1968).
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Despite this situation, however, the vast majority of extradition treaties
are bilateral. Is there some feature of extradition that makes it particularly
incompatible with multilateral treaties? Is it mere chance or an accident of
history? Or is some other factor at work here?
The choice between multilateral and bilateral treaties may be seen as a
negotiation problem. Negotiation theorists note that multilateral
agreements, although necessary in some situations, present additional
strategic barriers for parties. 50 First, the process of creating value is much
more complicated in multilateral contexts. If we define a value-enhancing
deal as one that is Pareto-efficient - that is, one in which one party can
be made better off only by making the other party worse off - then
negotiations will only create value if each party has veto power. But if each
party has veto power, a real risk of holdout problems arises. For example,
assume that there are five parties to a negotiation. Four parties reach a deal
that is satisfactory to them. The fifth party can exercise considerable power
over the process by threatening to veto the entire deal. As long as each
party has veto power, the holdout problem can lead to a never-ending
cycle of threats and compromises.15 1 The resulting transaction costs can be
prohibitive. Furthermore, the increased number of parties increases the
likelihood that there is no zone of possible agreement (or ZOPA, in the
terminology of negotiation theorists) at all.152 In other words, if every party
has a veto, then many arrangements that might benefit the vast majority of
parties could be stymied by a few dissenters.
Multilateral negotiations also raise issues of coalition-building.153 If a
negotiated agreement is being prevented by a minority of the parties, the
other parties can decide to split off and negotiate an agreement amongst
themselves. Although this option reduces the holdout problems associated
with multilateral negotiations, it simultaneously creates a new set of issues.
Coalition-building may at times make the parties that have been left out of
the deal worse off than they were before negotiations began. For example,
regional trade agreements often divert beneficial trade away from the states
that are not privy to the trade agreement.154 The harm created by the
agreement may at times outweigh the benefits of the agreement. States
may decide to forego multilateral negotiations to prevent this kind of
150. Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Baiers to Dispute Resolution: A Companson of Bilateral and
MulilateralNegotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2003).
151. Id. at 15.
152. Id. at 16.
153. Id. at 17.
154. Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya, Preferential Trading Areas, in THE EcONOMICS OF
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 6-7 (Jadish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1996);
Richard Baldwin, Regulatory Protectionism, Developing Nations and a Two-Tier World Trading System 1-2,
presented at Brookings Trade Forum, Oct. 2000, in BROOKINGs TRADE FORUM: 2000 (Dani Rodrik &
Susan M. Collins eds., 2001).
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harm. For all these reasons, from an institutionalist perspective, states may
have an interest in concluding bilateral extradition treaties in place of wider
multilateral ones.
The choice between bilateral and multilateral agreements may also
depend to a great extent on the subject matter of the agreement. Gabriella
Blum, for example, identifies several categories of activities, including
coordination activities, cooperation activities, universal goods, and
activities with externalities.155 Coordination activities are ones in which
states have an interest in adopting uniform policies but the actual policy
itself is undetermined prior to communication. After agreement has been
reached in this situation, then, there is no incentive to defect. One example
of a coordination activity is the international code for aerial
communication, where all countries can benefit from a uniform method of
communication between airplanes, regardless of what that method is.15 6
Cooperation activities, on the other hand, are activities in which parties
can achieve gains by reaching agreement but in which states have
incentives to cheat after agreement has been reached.157 A typical example
of this regime is nuclear disarmament: If both parties can agree to limit
their nuclear arsenals, both countries are better off, but a party can gain an
advantage if it builds up its arsenal without the other party's knowledge.
Universal goods are goods that are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable,
meaning that consumption of the good does not reduce its availability for
others and that no individual can be effectively excluded from using the
good. Environmental issues, such as global warming, are generally
understood as universal good-type regimes. 15 8 Finally, externality-
projecting activities are activities that affect states not involved in the
activity. Most often, we think about externalities as negative factors, such
as when pollution from one state seeps into another state. Agreements
may, however, produce positive externalities. Many commentators argue
that the U.S.-Soviet arms reduction agreements benefited countries around
the world, not just the United States and the Soviet Union.'59
Blum argues that this typology of regimes is helpful in understanding
how states structure their agreements. Coordination activities, according to
Blum, are generally most efficiently regulated through multilateral treaties,
because these activities typically involve many states and require active
monitoring, assistance, and dissemination of information.160 Cooperation
activities are a bit more complicated. Multilateral regimes increase
155. Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 323, 354 (2008).
156. Id. at 354-55.
157. Id. at 356.
158. Id. at 357.
159. Id. at 361.
160. Id. at 355.
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incentives for compliance, reduce fears of defection by others, and
overcome collective action problems, but they also make retaliation against
cheaters more difficult. Reciprocity becomes diffused among a number of
parties, as does retaliation. The diffusion of reciprocity may reduce the
effectiveness of the agreement. 161 Thus, in the context of cooperation
activities, Blum argues that bilateral agreements are "easier to negotiate,
monitor, and enforce through direct retaliation." 162
Blum argues that multilateral agreements are clearly preferable with
regard to universal goods.163 Because universal goods affect the entire
international community, their regulation requires wide participation to be
effective. Where the goods at issue are relevant to a more limited subset of
parties, or where differences between countries are pronounced,
bilateralism may be more effective. Finally, the presence of externalities
often renders bilateral agreements inefficient. When the effects of an
agreement are felt by states not party to the agreement, these effects are
often not taken into consideration when determining the obligations of the
member-states. Thus, an agreement that is a net loss for all the relevant
parties may still be concluded if some of those parties are not involved in
the negotiations. Blum argues that multilateral treaties are useful in
"mitigating negative externalities and in redistributing the benefits of
positive externalities." 164 At the same time, parties may not want to include
all the negatively affected parties if doing so will require more concessions
from them.
Blum specifically addresses the issue of extradition at several points.
First, she argues that extradition arrangements are not a universal good
and thus are best regulated through bilateral treaties. Extradition treaties,
she suggests, are highly contingent on differences between countries and
require reciprocal exchanges of commitments. Blum concludes that these
factors make extradition a subject matter most effectively regulated by
bilateral agreements, rather than multilateral agreements. Many countries
would object to a multilateral treaty on extradition, she argues, "partly due
to domestic constitutional constraints prohibiting the extradition of one
country's citizens to another country, and . .. partly due to a reluctance to
extradite people to countries that have disreputable legal or punitive
systems."165 In addition, Blum asserts that extradition arrangements
impose "almost no externalities" on third parties.166 In other words, the
extradition of an individual from one state to another does not affect the
161. Id. at 356-57. See also Robert 0. Keohane, Reacrociy in International Relations, 40 INT'L ORG.
1, 23-24 (1986).
162. Blum, supra note 155, at 357.
163. Id. at 357.
164. Id. at 361.
165. Id. at 360.
166. Id. at 361.
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interests of other states. For these reasons, extradition is an area in which
"multilateralism is bound to fail." 67
The international relations and negotiation literature provides
substantial insight into why states would choose to enter into bilateral,
rather than multilateral, extradition treaties. While the transaction costs of
negotiating hundreds of bilateral agreements may be high, the difficulty of
finding common ground with multiple states is high as well. In fact, there
may be no agreement that would adequately meet the demands of all
states, if we take seriously Blum's assertion that domestic preferences vary
widely with regard to extradition. The legal regimes within states governing
extradition, such as the extraditability of citizens and the legal process of
foreign states, may differ so much that negotiating a truly multilateral
treaty would be prohibitively expensive. In negotiation terms, there may be
no ZOPA at all. Furthermore, taken individually, bilateral extradition
treaties are easy to monitor and enforce, as reciprocity and retaliation is
direct. All these considerations suggest that extradition is a subject best left
to bilateral treaties.
While current theory provides useful insights into extradition
arrangements, it fails to take into account the effect of domestic politics on
state decision-making in important ways. Blum's assertion that
multilateralism is bound to fail with regard to extradition treaties is not
entirely convincing. First, multilateralism appears to be growing. The
recent advent of the European Arrest Warrant shows that the advantages
of multilateral extradition treaties are not negligible. The speed and
uniformity of the European Arrest Warrant may convince other countries
that multilateral treaties are more effective.168 Second, the theoretical
advantages of multilateral extradition treaties are strong. Extradition is
based partly on an understanding that individuals will be less likely to
commit crimes if they know that they will be unable to escape punishment.
A truly universal extradition system, in which all countries participate,
could be more effective at disincentivizing crime, and crime-fighting is
politically popular and thus attractive to elected officials. Similarly, a single
extradition code would help governments and officials better understand
167. Id. at 360.
168. It might be argued that the European Arrest Warrant is not truly a multilateral agreement
because it is an act of a single body, the European Union. While this may be true, the European
Union is not a state as that term is traditionally understood. The acts of the European Union apply to
a number of states, and in this sense, they are multilateral agreements. For discussion of the debate,
see Trevor C. Hartley, International Law and the Law of the European Union - A Reassessment, 72 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2001); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Idea ofEuropean International Law, 17 EUR.J.
INT'L L. 315, 345 (2006); Theodor Schilling, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order An Anaysis of
Possible Foundations, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 389, 389 (1996).
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the requirements for extradition and reduce the likelihood that extradition
would be denied because of procedural mistakes.' 69
It is also unclear that extradition treaties have "almost no externalities" for
third parties, as Blum asserts. 70 Domestic groups in third-party countries
may well have an interest in the extradition proceedings of two states,
particularly if those other states are extraditing citizens from the third-
party country. If we believe the claim that the prosecution of a state's
citizens in a foreign country is a matter of interest to groups in that state,
then the extradition arrangements of other states become a matter of real
concern to government officials. The case of Viktor Bout, the Russian
businessman suspected of running an arms trafficking organization, is a
paradigmatic example of this interest. The United States suspected that
Bout was providing weapons to governments, rebels, and insurgents
around the world. His activities inspired the 2005 film Lord of War and a
book, Merchant of Death. In 2008, Thai authorities arrested Bout after he
agreed to sell weapons to undercover U.S. agents posing as rebels from the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). The United States
requested his extradition. Russia protested vigorously against Bout's
extradition, arguing that the United States was putting pressure on the
Thai government to extradite an innocent Russian citizen. Eventually, Thai
courts authorized Bout's extradition, and Russia angrily denounced the
ruling as an "illegal political decision."' 7' Russia's response to Bout's
extradition demonstrates that it perceived an interest in the extradition
treaty between Thailand and the United States: It wanted to ensure that the
treaty gave adequate protection to Russian citizens. This interest may have
stemmed from pressure from local interest groups, or it may have come
from the personal interests of government officials. Regardless, the angry
protestations of Russian officials after Bout's arrest show just how
important the issue was to them. Thus, it appears that in many cases
extradition arrangements between two states project externalities onto
other states. These externalities are only evident when we look at
extradition from the perspective of domestic politics, and they may help
explain why states are increasingly opting for multilateral treaties today.
The significance of the externalities depends on the likelihood of citizens'
169. The Polanski case here comes to mind, although instances of procedural mistakes in
extradition abound. See David Makovsky & Alon Pinkas, Peres: PA Not Obliged to Give Up Hamas Men,
JERUSALEM POST 1 (Aug. 28, 1995) (noting that Israel was forced to reissue extradition requests for
fourteen terrorist suspects to the Palestinian Authority because of technical mistakes in the first
requests); Avi Meir, Mondrouitr Extradition Denied by Israel's Supremne Court, 5TJT.COM (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://tinyurl.com/2uzn9jf (noting that Israel denied a U.S. extradition request for an accused
pedophile due to the statute of limitations).
170. Blum, supra note 155, at 360.
171. Thomas Fuller, Arms Suspect Vows to Win Case in U.S. after Extradition Order, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 20, 2010), http://tinyurl.com/3785rnt.
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extradition, along with the country's particular preferences with regard to
the prosecution of both domestic and foreign individuals. These
preferences, in turn, are formed by the structure of domestic politics.
C Treaty Discretion
Treaty discretion is the final element of extradition structure that we must
address. To a certain extent, all treaties are binding. Indeed, that is the very
definition of a treaty, as the Vienna Convention states: "Every treaty in force
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith."172 At the same time, treaties in fact vary in the strictness of their
obligations. Some treaties contain specific and clear obligations for parties,
while others have more ambiguous requirements and grant some flexibility to
states in deciding how to implement them.7 3 In the context of extradition,
an important consideration is the amount of discretion that states reserve
for themselves in the decision whether to extradite an individual.
Traditional international relations theories argue that states want to
maximize their flexibility in deciding how to comply with treaty
obligations) 74 This flexibility allows states to reevaluate their interests
continuously and decide what course of action to take. By maintaining a
full range of options in future actions, states can ensure that they are not
constrained in confronting emerging problems. Flexibility becomes
particularly important when future payoffs are uncertain. 175
Flexibility, however, can be a two-edged sword: It may at times give
states greater freedom to pursue their self-interests, but it may also limit
their freedom to enter into beneficial agreements with other states. As
mentioned above, states also have an interest in having the capacity to
make credible commitments to other states. If states cannot make binding
commitments, then their promises have little value to other states. Other
states will not want to enter into agreements with them, and cooperation
will become difficult. For these reasons, states at times desire to in effect
"bind themselves to the mast," committing themselves to a course of
action and stripping themselves of all power to cheat.
Institutionalist theories of international law, however, struggle to
explain how states can in fact credibly commit themselves. They may rely
on concepts of reputation or patterns of cooperation, but these
172. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
173. See Daniel E. Ho, Compliance and International Soft Lw: Why Do Countries ImpIement the Basle
Accord? 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 647, 649-50 (2002); Raustiala, supra note 121.
174. See ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 23 (1975);
Robert Gilpin, No One Loves a Politica/Realist, 3 SECURITY STUDIES 5, 6 (1996).
175. See Charles Lipson, lf/hy Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495, 519-
20 (1991); Beth A. Simmons, International Efforts Against Money Laundering, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 245,
262 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
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explanations prove weak in a number of contexts.17 6 When a state is seen
as monolithic and entirely self-interested in a narrowly conceived way, it is
difficult to imagine a state committing itself to actions that are not, in the
future, viewed as utility-enhancing. A closer look at domestic institutions
solves many of these problems. Decision-makers within states may be able
to credibly commit themselves to future actions if they delegate decision-
making to other domestic institutions. For example, if the president of the
United States believes that extradition agreements are sufficiently
important, he might delegate individual decisions about extraditability to
courts. This delegation might reassure other states that the president will
not violate treaty provisions in politically sensitive cases. Of course, the
ability for a country to commit itself by leveraging diverse domestic
institutions depends on the assumption that different institutions have
different interests and viewpoints. In other words, if we believe that U.S.
courts are not truly independent of presidential pressure, then the
delegation of decision-making to courts will not provide much assurance
to other countries. These issues are more prevalent in countries that do
not have strong separation of powers or that have weak institutions.
Where the rule of law is absent, states may not be able to delegate
decision-making to alternate institutions in order to increase the power of
their commitments.
The advantages of delegation were amply demonstrated in the passage
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The doctrine of
sovereign immunity holds that a state is generally immune from civil or
criminal suits. The rule was grounded on concepts of international comity
and the "perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns." 77
Before 1976, states that were sued in the United States could only assert
sovereign immunity if the State Department, within its discretion,
recognized the defense.17 8 The blatantly political nature of sovereign
immunity decisions, and the unfettered discretion granted to the executive,
led to tension with foreign countries, as other countries knew that the
executive could grant or reject sovereign immunity in any case.179 In order
to remedy these tensions, Congress passed the FSIA, a principal purpose
176. See Olivier Compte, On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private, 102 J. EcoN. THEORY
151 (2001); George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, Repeated Games ith Almost-Public Monitoring, 102 J.
ECON. THEORY 189 (2001); Matthew Stephenson, "When the Devil Turns.: The Political Foundations
ofIndependentJudidal Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 68-69 (2003).
177. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
178. See David A. Brittenham, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activity: A Conflicts
Approach, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1440 (1983); Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commerial Actidly Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L.
489, 491 (1992); Jack Garvey, judicial Foreign Polig-Making in International Civl Liigation: Ending the
Charade ofSeparation ofPonwers, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 461, 463 (1993).
179. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Exparte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S.
578 (1943).
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of which was to "transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from
the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign
policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that
these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under
procedures that insure due process." 18 0 The FSIA thus restricted executive
discretion on the question of sovereign immunity. Interestingly, the FSIA
was not a power-grab by Congress at the protest of the executive branch.
Instead, the FSIA was actually drafted by the Departments of State and
Justice.'18 The executive desired to limit its own discretion in order to
promote good relations with other states. The story of the FSIA
demonstrates just how valuable credible commitments can be for a state
and for domestic officials.
Extradition similarly exhibits the complicated interplay between
discretion and obligation in international law. As described earlier,
extradition has become a legalized phenomenon in which discretion is
highly cabined.182 When an extradition request is made on a state, the
judiciary has a very limited number of duties in determining whether an
individual is extraditable. These generally revolve around whether the
allegations and evidence are sufficient to make the case fall under the
applicable extradition treaty.183 The obligation to extradite is often absolute
if these requirements are met.184 The obligatory nature of many extradition
agreements suggests that states are interested in making binding
commitments in this area. The value of cooperation thus outweighs the
reduction in flexibility. This assessment also suggests that uncertainty
about the future is a lesser concern in extradition cases. Countries appear
to be willing to make irrevocable commitments to extradite suspected
criminals to other countries. The inflammatory nature of extraditions
might partially explain this willingness. The extradition of popular figures,
or the nonextradition of unpopular ones, can often be harmful to
government officials. By ceding its discretion in these affairs, the executive
branch can reduce the harmful effect of extradition decisions. In other
words, government officials are widely immune from public scrutiny about
extradition decisions as long as those decisions are viewed as legal, not
180. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
181. See Note, The Impact of S.566 on the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 179
(1974); Note, Soveregn Immunity: Prposed Statutory Elimination of State Department Role, 15 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 157 (1974).
182. See supra Part I.
183. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2006).
184. See Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (1962); 106
INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 267 (Elihu Lauterpacht et. al. eds., 1997) (stating that "[t]he power
to grant or refuse extradition is no longer a discretionary power, at least between the States parties to
the European Convention of 1957").
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political, decisions.'85 Of course, some skeptical domestic observers may
doubt that the decisions are truly nonpolitical, as Americans have doubted
the legality of the Swiss decision to deny extradition of Polanski, but the
legally binding nature of these treaties lessens the pressure for
intervention. Thus, the binding nature of extradition treaties and the tightly
restricted judicial discretion in extradition decisions serve at least two
purposes: First, they signal the seriousness of the state's commitment to
abide by its obligations to other nations; and second, they insulate
government officials from domestic pressure with regard to extradition
decisions.186
To say that extradition law is an entirely judicial process absent of
discretion, however, would be to overlook some essential features of
extradition. In the United States, for example, the action of the executive
with respect to extradition cases was originally considered purely
ministerial: If the judiciary found that the requirements of the extradition
treaty were satisfied, the executive was duty-bound to surrender the
individual.'8 7 No executive discretion was admitted. With time, however,
the Secretary of State began to assert a power to independently interpret
the relevant treaties and law.'8 8
Other countries have blunted the inflexible nature of extradition treaties
by reading domestic law to grant some discretion to the executive branch.
Both France and Switzerland have asserted that their governments retain
discretion to make the ultimate judgment about whether to extradite a
fugitive, even in the presence of a treaty that purports to create an absolute
duty to extradite. For example, a French lawmaker has explained that "[i]n
any case where a judicial decision authorizes extradition, the Government
reserves the right to refuse extradition on grounds of which it shall remain
the sole judge."' 89 Swiss legal commentators have also explained that "the
duty to extradite imposed by the European Convention on Extradition
must be overridden if international public policy stands in its way."190
These assertions of discretion may reduce the power of French and Swiss
officials to make binding commitments with other countries in the area of
extradition, and they also open the door to domestic pressure in
particularly sensitive extradition proceedings. On the other hand, such
185. Cf Raustiala, supra note 121, at 595-97 (explaining that non-state actors prefer for
international agreements to take the form of binding legal contracts as opposed to mere pledges).
186. Cf id. (explaining that legal agreements increase governmental obligations and that these
increased obligations lead non-state actors to prefer binding contracts in international agreements).
187. MOORE, supra note 39, at § 361.
188. See In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 281, 295 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 13,562) (in which the
Secretary of State refused to extradite a Prussian citizen because the alleged offense occurred in
Belgium, not Prussia).
189. 106 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS, supra note 184, at 268.
190. Id. at 269.
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discretion suggests that government officials are concerned with future
uncertainty about extradition decisions.
Such explicit recognition of the nonbinding nature of extradition
obligations is curious, though. If domestic officials have an interest in
denying an extradition request, there are many less harmful ways of
preventing extradition. As one commentator has explained, "[i]t is
sufficient merely not to employ any zeal in attempting to arrest the
individual whose surrender is sought, even if it means helping that person
to avoid arrest and makes his capture impossible, in order to paralyze the
implementation of extradition proceedings."'91 In other words, there are
ways in which a state can pursue its interest in nonextradition while
maintaining a reputation for law-abidingness. Of course, while this may be
a good option for some states, for other states, in which the judiciary and
police operate relatively independently of executive decisions, it may not
be an option at all.
The binding nature of extradition treaties, and the ways that executives
have disempowered themselves, demonstrates the strong tension that
government officials perceive between maintaining flexibility in the future
and making credible commitments in the present. This balance has been
constantly evolving and has never been fully resolved by states.
III. THE SUBSTANCE OF EXTRADITION TREATIES
Generalizing about the substance of extradition treaties is difficult
because of the amazing variety we find in current agreements. However, a
few strands may be picked out and identified. Three aspects of extradition
obligations are of particular interest: first, why states have crafted a
citizenship exception to extradition treaties; second, why and when states
scrutinize the legal regimes in foreign states; and third, why states often
exclude political crimes from extradition treaties. In the history of
extradition, these have been some of the most controversial and
prominent features of debate. This section will examine these questions in
order to cast light on the depth of international legal commitments in the
field of extradition.192
A. The Citienshp Exception to Extradition
Most extradition treaties today contain provisions exempting citizens of
the requested state from extradition. This exception provides a very
obvious loophole through which alleged criminals may run. In fact, one
191. Id. at 270 (quoting Repertaire Dalo Droitpenale, mub Extradition, No. 297).
192. See Raustiala, supra note 121, at 581 (stating that substance refers to "the deviation from the
status quo that an agreement demands").
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might suspect that the first place an individual sought by a foreign country
would seek solace would be his home country. Beyond knowledge of the
language, society, culture, and land, the awareness of immunity from
extradition makes home countries a tempting location for fugitives. The
citizenship exception from extradition is therefore potentially a glaring
exception to general extradition obligations.193
As discussed previously, government decision-makers often perceive an
interest in promoting the rule of law and disincentivizing crime, and one
way they pursue this interest is by concluding extradition treaties.
Extradition treaties assist states in ensuring that the purposes of criminal
law are not frustrated by territorial boundaries. At the same time,
government officials may have other interests, such as protecting their
citizens from harm. If a state were obliged to extradite any citizen
suspected of committing a crime by a foreign state, then its citizens could
risk foreign persecution. The United States has demonstrated its own
reluctance to submit its citizens to judgment abroad by concluding bilateral
agreements with a number of countries to ensure that U.S. citizens are not
subjected to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.194
One potential explanation for the citizenship exception, then, is that
states have accurately weighed the benefits and costs of extradition, and
they find that the relevant costs of extradition exceed the benefits when
citizens are involved. The protection of one's own citizens outweighs the
benefits of promoting the rule of law in a foreign country. This calculus
changes, however, when noncitizens are involved. When Britain extradites
a Moroccan citizen to the United States, for example, the relevant costs of
extradition are reduced because no British citizens are involved. The cost
is borne by Morocco, whose citizen is threatened with prosecution by a
foreign government. This is an externality, a cost that is not felt by the
negotiators, so we might expect that bilateral extradition treaties will only
marginally consider the interests of third parties." 5 The citizenship
exception ensures that the main costs of extradition will be borne by third
parties and not the negotiating partners.
193. Of course, the requested state may prosecute its citizens for crimes committed outside its
territory if prosecution is provided for by domestic law. For a discussion of the proper extent of
extraterritorial application of domestic law, see I. Glenn Cohen, Medical Outlaws or Medical
Refugees?: Circumvention Medical Tourism and the Extraterritorial Application of Domestic
Criminal Law (August 5, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Journal of
International Law Association).
194. The United States threatened to cut off foreign aid to any country that did not conclude a
bilateral agreement preventing U.S. citizens from prosecution in the International Criminal Court.
Alisha D. Telchi, The International Criminal Court. Is the United States Overlooking an Easier Way to Hold
Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden Accountable for their Actions?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 451, 451-54
(2004).
195. See Howard F. Chang, Carts, Sticks, and International Externalties, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
309, 309 (1997).
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Not all treaties include exceptions for citizens. The extradition treaty
between the United States and Israel, for example, states that a "requested
Party shall not decline to extradite a person sought because such person is
a national of the requesting Party."' 96 Similar provisions occur in U.S.
extradition treaties with the United Kingdom,197 Italy,198 and Uruguay.199
The close political and diplomatic ties between these countries may explain
why the states are more willing to extradite their own citizens. Concerns
about persecution may be mitigated when allies deal with one another, so
pressure from domestic interest groups may accordingly be lower. These
concerns are not fully eliminated, though. In 1978, the Israeli Knesset
enacted a statute prohibiting the extradition of Israeli citizens, despite the
explicit provision to the contrary in their extradition treaty. 200 The fact that
Israel would risk violating its international obligations in order to prevent
the extradition of its citizens shows just how powerful its perceived
interest in a citizenship exception was. It also suggests that the exception is
not unilaterally imposed by the United States, but rather is at times
imposed or demanded by the weaker party.201
Public choice theory may provide greater insight into the incentives of
domestic actors in the context of citizenship exceptions.202 Public choice
theorists generally assume that state preferences are formed by the
domestic political activities of groups and individuals. 203 The interests of a
government are not predetermined, but are rather a function of the
pressures brought to bear on government officials. These pressures,
however, are not always entirely rational or equitable. Governments will
not necessarily give equal importance to the views of different individuals.
An important insight of public choice theory is that certain groups possess
disproportionate levels of influence on government preferences. These
influences can sometimes bias national decisions in favor of one group or
196. Convention on Extradition, U.S.-Isr., Dec. 10, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1707 (amended by 18 U.S.T.
382 on Apr. 11, 1967).
197. Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, art. III, March 31, 2003, 28 U.S.T. 227 (entered into force April 26,
2007).
198. Extradition Treaty, U.S.-It., art. IV, Oct. 13, 1983, T.I.A.S. 10837.
199. Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Ur., art. IV, April 6, 1973, 35 U.S.T. 3206.
200. See Yaffa Zilbershats, Extraditing Israeli Cierens to the United States - Extradition and
Otitenshb Dilemmas, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 297, 311 (2000). It should be noted that in 1999, Israel
decided that it would allow the extradition of its citizens on the condition that they serve their prison
sentences in Israel. See Perelman, supra note 134, 7.
201. See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power
Differendals in Negohaons, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 18 (2000).
202. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of International
Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 20-21 (2008).
203. See 3 DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE §5 1-2 (2003).
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another.204 Equally important, government officials are themselves
autonomous actors with interests and desires.205 Thus, representatives may
be motivated by a desire for re-election. Bureaucrats may be motivated by
career advancement. Furthermore, just as government officials may be
influenced by the pressures placed on them by domestic civic groups,
government officials may also be influenced by other groups within the
government.
One important dynamic of domestic politics is the relationship of the
executive to the legislature. 206 This "two-level game," in which the
executive branch must negotiate with other states but must ultimately
bring any agreement back to the legislature for approval, creates a number
of implications for negotiation strategy. 207 A recalcitrant legislature may
hinder an executive in negotiating a treaty by removing certain options
from the table, but it may also give the executive leverage, as the other
state will know that any treaty must ultimately be ratified by the
legislature. 208 Negotiation theorists have identified this as a "commitment"
strategy. 209 The commitment strategy is often analogized to a game of
"chicken." In that game, two cars line up on opposite sides of a street and
then drive directly at one another. The loser, or chicken, is the driver who
turns away first. One potential strategy to winning the game is to convince
the other driver that you will not turn away. In such a situation, unless the
other driver is suicidal, he will turn away before collision. The trick, of
course, is finding out a way to convince the other driver of your intentions.
The commitment strategy calls for an irrevocable act that signals your
commitment to a course of action, in this case, throwing your steering
wheel out of the window. As long as the other driver sees this action and
has not done the same, you are highly likely to win.210 In the extradition
context, an executive may be able to follow a similar approach, using a
legislature's demands as a kind of commitment strategy that indicates to
other nations that some conditions are non-negotiable. Similarly, the
executive may also use the constraints of international negotiations to help
win over domestic constituencies.
204. See MANCUR OLSON,JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTON: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
205. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Tbeory of PoliticalAction in a Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON.
135, 137 (1957); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Electoral Competition and Special Interest
Politics, 63 REV. ECON. STUD. 265, 266 (1996).
206. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomag and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L
ORG. 427, 433-35 (1988).
207. Id.
208. See I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 111-14 (4th ed. 2005).
209. See HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION 11 (1965). See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22-28 (1960).
210. See KAHN, supra note 209, at 11.
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In order to understand the citizenship exception in context, then, we
must identify the most relevant actors and examine their various interests,
incentives, and constraints. A brief analysis of the U.S.-U.K. extradition
treaty, and events following its entry into force, is enlightening.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush
Administration sought to implement a number of measures aimed at
improving their ability to arrest, interrogate, and prosecute individuals
suspected of terrorism. One of the prongs of this effort was the
conclusion of new, robust extradition arrangements with countries in
which terrorist suspects might be located.211 The United States worried
that citizenship exceptions hindered their efforts to apprehend and
investigate terrorist suspects. Thus, the U.S. administration sought to
include provisions in the extradition agreements mandating the extradition
of nationals. The U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty, concluded in 2003, therefore
did not include a citizenship exception to its general obligations.212 As a
consequence, citizens are fully extraditable under the treaty.
It did not take long before these provisions were called into question. In
2004, the United States requested the extradition of three former
employees of the British bank, National Westminster (now the Royal Bank
of Scotland), on charges of financial fraud related to the Enron fiasco.213
Although the "NatWest 3" were British citizens, they were charged with
defrauding American investors and violating American wire fraud laws. 214
Their eventual extradition provoked an outcry among civil rights groups
and the business community in the United Kingdom, leading to street
protests and an emergency meeting of Parliament.215 The Confederation of
British Industry, the most influential business lobby in Britain, led the
attack on the extradition treaty.216 British civil rights groups also played an
important part in criticizing the extradition. 217 Public relations advisers
lobbied politicians and the media.218 The British government complained
211. See Letter from James J. Foster, Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Mission to the
European Union, to Romano Prodi, President, Commission of the European Communities (Oct. 16,
2001), available athttp://tinyurl.com/ccyvzuz.
212. Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, supra note 197, at art. III.
213. See Kate Murphy, Fraud Case Tied to Enron Ends in Prison for 3 Men, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2008, http://tinyurl.com/cnpmcee.
214. See Michael D. Mann et al., Developments in the Intemationalitation of Securities Enforcement, in
GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS & THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2009: STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGING
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 789, 813-14 (Nicolas Grabar & Ethiopis Tafara eds., 2009).
215. See Alan Cowell, A U.K. Court Approves Extradition of 3 Bankers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004,
Finance at 13; Murphy, supra note 213; UK Extradites Three Bankers, WALL ST.J., July 11, 2006, at C3.
216. See Steven Foley, NatWest Three Given Three-Year jail Sentences for Enron Fraud,
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 23, 2008, News at 12.
217. See Katie Allen, NatWest Three: Media Campaign: It War About the US Extradition Treaty, Not
Tbem' GUARDIAN, Feb. 22, 2008, Financial Pages at 28.
218. Id.
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about the treaty's failings, stating that "[t]he situation is grossly unfair and
it is exasperating that the Americans seem to hold all the cards."2 19 The
Daily Telegraph, a conservative London newspaper, launched a campaign
against the treaty, arguing that "[t]he UK had allowed a very unsatisfactory
extradition arrangement to develop which put the UK citizen at an unfair
disadvantage when it comes to dealing with US authorities." 220 Prime
Minister Tony Blair faced severe criticism over his handling of the case
and the negotiation of the extradition treaty.221
The pressure from powerful domestic constituencies led Gordon
Brown's government to enact a statute allowing the home secretary to veto
the extradition of British citizens.222 Some commentators have suggested
that the statute was motivated most immediately by concern that senior
executives of British Airways might face extradition over charges of price-
fixing.223 Without a doubt, the new law was at least partially a response to
the widespread outcry, particularly prevalent in the London business
community, against the extradition of the NatWest 3.
The NatWest example demonstrates how domestic groups and
individuals can mobilize public opinion, and therefore pressure politicians,
to promote certain agendas on the international stage. In this case,
influential business groups in London faced the threat of prosecution in
the United States for actions that took place almost entirely in the United
Kingdom. They feared that being subject to the vagaries of the.U.S. justice
system would put businessmen in an unacceptably risky position. As the
chairman of the Confederation of British Industry argued, the NatWest
bankers "represent no threat to society, yet they will be banged up in a US
prison with rapists and drug addicts, deprived of their liberty for up to two
years even while a case is compiled." 224 Business groups formed a coalition
with civil rights groups, who feared that American protections of civil
liberties were insufficient. These groups lobbied the media and politicians
to suspend or modify the extradition treaty. Eventually, facing enough
pressure, the majority Labour government enacted legislation to protect
British citizens from prosecution in the United States. The international
law of extradition, and especially the citizenship exception, depends to a
great extent on this kind of interaction between domestic groups and
219. David Cracknell & Sarah Baxter, Hain Backs NatWest 3 Fight, SUNDAY TIMES (London), July
9, 2006, News at 2.
220. Allen, supra note 217 (quoting Damian Reece, head of business at the Daily Telegraph)
221. See Frank Millat, Suicide of Witness as NatfWest Three' Set for US Trial, 1RIsH TIMES, July 13,
2006, (World), at 10.
222. See David Leppard, Minister Gets Power to Veto US Extraditions, SUNDAY TIMES (London),
Oct. 14, 2007, News at 4.
223. See, e.g., id.
224. Nat West Three: Protest March Today Against Extradition to USA, INDYMEDIA UK Oune 29,
2006, 3:05 AM), http://tinyurl.com/8ymgdhd.
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government officials. Domestic pressure forces governments to construct
a new vision of state interests in international law, and these constructed
interests are formulated and codified in treaties with other states. In this
case, the citizenship exception, although originally excluded because of
security concerns, eventually found its way in through the back door by
domestic legislation.
B. The Rule of Noninquiry
One of the most debated issues in extradition is whether states may
refuse to extradite individuals to countries in which the individual may face
unfair or inhumane treatment. There are few instances that provide a
starker example of the conflict between individual rights and state rights in
international law. On the one hand, extradition treaties often oblige states
to render individuals suspected of crimes to other states. On the other
hand, many times the receiving state has a faulty or affirmatively corrupt
justice system. Indeed, some requests seem to be explicitly motivated by
revenge, as was Charles II's request for the return of regicides. 225 The
likelihood of an extraditee receiving a fair trial under these circumstances
can be small. For this reason, human rights groups have often protested
the extradition of individuals to countries with poor human rights
records.226 These concerns extend even to U.S. extradition requests, where
some countries worry that individuals will face the death penalty or other
harsh punishments. 227
225. See CLARKE, supra note 36, at 20.
226. See, e.g., Barbara Demick, China Says Terrorist Cell Broken: Officials Say They Arrested 10
Separatists Who Represented Major Threats, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2010, at A4.
227. The most well-known case involving the denial of a U.S. extradition request based on the
conditions of the U.S. justice system is Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 439
(1989). After the U.K. Foreign Minister ordered Soering's extradition, Soering applied for relief to
the European Commission on Human Rights, arguing that the "death row phenomenon" constituted
"inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" in violation of the European Convention on
Human Rights. Id. at 464. The European Court of Human Rights eventually held that Soering's
extradition would violate the European Convention. According to the court, an extradition violates
the European Convention "where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the
[individuall, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment in the requesting country." Id. at 468. The Court concluded that the death row
phenomenon (including the "extreme stress, psychological deterioration and risk of homosexual
abuse and physical attack undergone by prisoners on death row," along with "the very long period of
time spent on death row in such extreme conditions, with the ever present and mounting anguish of
awaiting execution of the death penalty") amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment. Id at 460,
478. See also Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judiaal Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition Cases After
Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85 (1992) (examining Soering and concluding that much of the rationale
justifying the traditionally limited judicial role in extradition law has evaporated as foreign legal
systems have become increasingly accessible and human rights norms have solidified). For a more
recent case of an extradition denial based on human rights, see Robert Wielaard, RIghts Court Halts
Extradition ofFour Terror Suspects to US, BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 2010, at 5.
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Despite such concerns, many countries have adopted a rule of
noninquiry, under which courts may not examine the requesting country's
justice system or human rights record in determining whether to extradite
an individual.228 If the extradition request meets the procedural
requirements of the treaty, extradition must be granted.229 Although the
rule has come under increased scrutiny in the post-World War II human
rights era, the general contours of the doctrine still hold sway.
Why do some states still apply the rule of noninquiry in extradition
proceedings, and why do some states refuse to apply the rule? What state
interests are at play when determining whether to examine the nature and
fairness of foreign justice? How do these interests cohere in international
extradition treaties?
At the most basic level, extraditions often implicate broader relations
with other countries. The denial of an extradition request can lead to
international tensions and can have serious foreign policy implications.
After all, extradition has long been viewed as a matter of international
comity and a way of promoting friendly relations between countries.230
Including a rule of noninquiry may increase the credibility of a
government's commitments to its obligations. When an extradition request
is denied, it can be harmful for domestic actors who have staked their
reputation on successfully arresting the suspect. In addition, one country's
decision that another country's justice system is unfair or biased can be
understood as a repudiation of all the commitments that the countries
mutually entered into in their extradition treaty. Finally, judicial inquiry
into another state's domestic practices entangles courts in conflict with
traditional understandings of state sovereignty and independence. 231 To be
more precise, as a prudential matter, there are concerns about the wisdom
of allowing one state's courts to sit in judgment on another's courts. In a
state-centric international system, many factors militate in favor of a rule
that state commitments are absolutely binding and not subject to further
judicial questioning, as such questioning might throw the binding nature of
other commitments into doubt.
Domestic institutions may have other reasons to favor a rule of
noninquiry in extradition decisions. The individuals, officials, and groups
involved in extradition proceedings have interests and incentives of their
own.232 U.S. State Department officials may be biased in favor of
228. See Semmelman, supra note 58, at 1198-99.
229. In the United States, the Secretary of State has discretion to refuse extradition, but this
discretion is rarely exercised. See Note, supra note 184, at 1328.
230. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990).
231. See Michael Scharf, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquit
Provision ofthe SupplementaU U.S. -U.K Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 257, 264 n. 34 (1989).
232. See Murchison, supra note 74; Ann Powers, justice Denied? The Adjudication of Extradition
Applications, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 277, passim (2002).
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promoting cordial relations with other nations because of their
institutional constraints and competencies. Courts are interested in the
efficient resolution of controversies and may lack the tools and time
necessary to investigate foreign justice systems. It is unclear that judges
have the ability to fairly assess the mechanisms and procedures of foreign
countries. The adversarial briefing system utilized in common law
countries may not provide a good way to educate a court about foreign
justice. Stability and consistency are not necessarily the most prevalent
attributes of courts, and thus negotiators may be wary to include such a
potentially powerful and unpredictable exception in extradition treaties.
The justice Department may also hesitate to second-guess the fairness or
motivations of extradition requests, as it has an interest in receiving
reciprocal cooperation from foreign ministries of justice. The constellation
of these interests combines to form a powerful interest in favor of a rule
of noninquiry in extradition proceedings. 233
Even if courts were equipped to analyze the fairness of foreign justice
systems, and other institutions approved, such an approach could
effectively exclude some countries from extradition at all. The mere fact
that a country's judicial system is perceived as unfair (an accusation that is
often leveled at the U.S. justice system, it should be noted234) does not
mean that other countries do not have an interest in mutual extradition
arrangements with that country. But the prospect of having extradition
requests denied may lead some decision-makers to forego the process
entirely. Alternatives to extradition, including forcible abduction or
extraordinary rendition, may be adopted instead. These alternatives may be
more politically harmful to government officials than formal extradition.
Thus, in deciding whether to adopt a rule of noninquiry, decision-makers
must consider whether this rule is a useful mechanism for harnessing
institutional competences and preventing potentially more harmful
alternatives to extradition.
In some circumstances, however, states may decide that the rule of
noninquiry is not appropriate. The United States takes a relatively
absolutist position with respect to the rule: Courts must not examine the
future treatment of the individual to be extradited.235 Still, some U.S.
extradition treaties give the parties more discretion, permitting a requested
state to refuse to extradite an individual when that individual faces a
likelihood of abuse or mistreatment in the requesting state. 236 Other
233. See Powers, supra note 232, at 314.
234. See Steven Erlanger, French See Case Against Strauss-Kahn as American Foll, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2011, at Al.
235. See John T. Parry, International Extradition, the Pule of Non-Inquiry, and the Problem of Sovereignty,
90 B.U. L. Rev. 1973, 1975 (2010).
236. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Neth., art. 7, no. 2, June 24, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 944;
Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Fin., art. 7, no. 1(c), May 11, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 944.
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treaties require states to refuse extradition in such cases.237 In Scandinavian
countries, for example, domestic laws impose an absolute requirement that
all extradition treaties include an exception for humanitarian grounds.238
These exceptions often occur in treaties with countries in which public
opinion strongly opposes the death penalty. Government officials in such
countries may fear the repercussions of extraditing individuals to countries
with subpar human rights records, as such actions might be unpopular or
might undermine citizens' trust in their own judicial system.
Similarly, the assumption that the rule of noninquiry encourages
cooperative relations between countries because it prevents either state
from looking at the fairness of criminal procedures in the other country is
not entirely persuasive. It may be true that, if an extradition treaty has been
completed and one state expects to reap the benefits of the treaty by
having criminal suspects rendered up to them, the denial of a request due
to inadequate criminal procedures in the requesting state will naturally
cause the requesting state to reassess the reliability of the other state as a
partner. A state that shirks its commitments is not a desirable negotiating
party. At the same time, this argument assumes that states do not expect
their partners to examine their judicial system. If the U.S. Justice
Department knows that Scandinavian countries will not extradite criminals
subject to the death penalty in the United States, and the treaty explicitly
provides for such a denial, then the denial itself can hardly be a cause for
tensions between the countries. No commitment has been breached, and
the countries have maintained a reputation for compliance.
The issue, then, would appear to be more closely related to
expectations. The rule of noninquiry promotes cooperation between states
to the extent that it clarifies expectations. In countries with clear domestic
rules governing extradition requests and the grounds for their denial, the
rule of noninquiry may not be a helpful tool in increasing the credibility of
commitments: Predicted behavior is already established through domestic
law. This may partially explain why European countries, whose positions
on the death penalty and other harsh forms of punishment are well-
known, generally do not include noninquiry provisions in extradition
treaties.239
237. See, e.g., Convention on Extradition, U.S.-Swed., art. 5, no. 6, Oct. 24, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 1845;
Treaty on Extradition, U.S.-Ir., art. IV, § c, July 13, 1983, T.I.A.S. 10813.
238. See Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cited in Semmelman, supra
note 58, at 1223 n.182.
239. See Jon Dugart & Christine Van Den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradiion with Human Rights, 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 187, 202 (1998).
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C Political Offenses
Now that we have discussed the citizenship exception and the rule of
noninquiry, we can proceed to a final aspect regarding the substance of
extradition treaties, the question of which crimes are included as
extraditable offenses. This question is essential to the analysis of
extradition treaties because it goes to the very root of what states are
interested in when they negotiate their extradition commitments. Without
an understanding of which criminals are in fact extradited between states,
we cannot have sophisticated knowledge of the mechanisms and purposes
of extradition law today. As mentioned previously, extradition changed
dramatically in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, evolving
from a largely political phenomenon that ignored common crimes to a
largely criminal phenomenon that exempted political crimes.
The political offense exception to extradition presents a number of
tricky questions for states. What constitutes a political offense, versus a
common crime? Must the political offense exception be included in a
treaty for it to be operable? How explicit and specific must a treaty be in
defining exceptions to its obligations in order for a state to deny
extradition? Controversy often erupts when what one state views as a
political offense is viewed by a requesting state as purely a common crime.
The political offense exception, thus, is a two-edged sword: It can provide
governments with some wiggle room regarding their otherwise absolute
obligation to extradite individuals, but it also potentially creates conflict
with treaty partners.
Take, for example, a 1973 extradition request made by the United States
on France. In that year, a group of five U.S. citizens hijacked a domestic
flight. Two of the hijackers had escaped from prison, where they were
serving sentences for armed robbery and murder. The hijackers requested
$1 million as ransom for freeing the passengers on board the plane, a sum
they received. The hijackers then forced the plane to fly them to Algeria.
The individuals were eventually identified and apprehended in Paris. The
United States sought extradition of the group on charges of aircraft piracy,
an offense that was included in the extradition treaty between the United
States and France. The French court, however, denied the extradition
request. According to the court, the extradition request fell under the
political offense exception because the true motive of the hijackers was to
escape racial segregation in the United States, and the charges against them
amounted to political persecution. 240
This case demonstrates just how broadly some states have read the
political offense exception. Far from protecting political revolutionaries, it
240. The Individual in Internaional Law: Extradiion, 1976 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS DIGEST( 5, at 124-25.
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appears at times to cover regular criminals who have committed terrible
crimes absent any real political motivations. The approach of the French
court in the above case is probably best understood as an inquiry into the
fairness of the American justice system, not an inquiry into the political
nature of the crime. Many states have essentially eviscerated the original
meaning of the political offense and have instead granted to themselves
wide latitude to determine which crimes are extraditable, even in the face
of explicit provisions in extradition treaties.
The political offense exception, thus, often serves as a kind of escape
hatch. It allows a state to refuse an extradition and yet remain within the
treaty framework. It provides a simple and defensible legal explanation for
noncompliance. This possibility is of tremendous value to states,
particularly when the stakes are high and when treaty substance is deep.
The ability to deny an otherwise lawful extradition request is especially
useful when domestic pressure against extradition is strong. This generally
occurs when a criminal suspect has active domestic support, is a member
of powerful or popular groups, or represents a particularly sympathetic
symbol. The hijacking case in France is a perfect example. There,
government officials faced serious pressure from their constituents to deny
extradition, and they had strong incentives to acquiesce to this pressure. In
such a case, the ability to provide a compelling reason, and one that was
foreseen in the extradition treaty, is useful to the state.
If it is domestic pressure that government officials are worried about,
then the political offense exception may be a very useful tool to further
this goal. There is reason to believe that domestic pressure on government
officials is highest when perceived political actions are implicated. In other
words, civic groups will exercise their political influence most when the
requested individual represents a political cause or is involved in political
activity. It is precisely political offenses, then, that concern the conflicting
incentives of government officials.
The political offense exception is also particularly valuable to states
when the extradition treaty has a deep level of substance, that is, when the
treaty creates a strong legal obligation for a state to act in a certain way. If
an extradition treaty contains wide grounds for flexibility in extradition
decisions, it may not be as important for states to have this escape valve
because they have other ways to avoid the reputational harm of
noncompliance with a treaty. But when the extradition treaty does not
provide significant powers of discretion to states to decide whether to
extradite, states face the risk of either complying with the demands of
citizens or complying with international legal obligations. If they decide to
grant extradition, the government decision-makers may lose office, raise
fewer campaign contributions, or face domestic criticism. Thus, their most
immediate incentives are to deny extradition. Yet if they decide to refuse
[Vol. 52:839
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
extradition, states can face harmful reputational consequences,
consequences that are not offset by any significant benefit.241 A state that
is seen to regularly disregard its international obligations will steadily lose
its credibility as a partner in international affairs, and other states will
become less willing to cooperate with it. No parties are made better off by
this loss of reputation. Thus, a political offense exception that gives states
some room to maneuver in extradition decisions can be beneficial in
certain circumstances.
It is important to note here that the discretion that the political offense
exception grants to states is of value both to the requested state and the
requesting state. Most obviously, it allows the requested state to deny
extradition with fewer negative domestic and international consequences.
But just as significantly, it provides benefits to the requesting state.
First, the political offense exception gives government officials in the
requesting state political cover for failing to acquire the suspect. Just as
government officials in the requested state may feel pressure from
domestic constituents, so too may government officials in the requesting
state be motivated by domestic pressure. The original extradition request
may have been animated by a desire to please powerful domestic groups. 242
The mere act of submitting a formal request for extradition may grant
government officials some political capital. It may deflect some of the
pressure from interest groups, and it will demonstrate that the government
is attempting to satisfy local demands. From an incentives perspective,
government officials may not be particularly concerned with the final
result of the extradition request, as the determination of extraditability
often comes after some period of time has passed and is entirely the
responsibility of the requested state. The political offense exception, thus,
provides government officials in the requesting state with the benefits of
extradition arrangements without imposing an undue cost on the
requested state.
Second, the political offense exception may be beneficial to the
requesting state from a reputational perspective as well. States are not
benefited when another state's reputation is harmed. Future cooperation
becomes problematic when the other state is viewed as an unreliable
partner. The requesting state would prefer to be able to cooperate with the
requested state in the future, and the political offense exception gives them
some leeway to do so. By keeping the requested state within the
international system of obligations, and within the society of law-abiding
nations, the exception can benefit all parties.
241. See generall Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of Internaional Law, supra note 85.
242. See ELTON V. SMITH, PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 59 (2002) (discussing
whether WTO complaints are motivated by special interests).
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Though treaties often include political offense exceptions, the exception
is not necessarily demanded or preferred by all domestic actors. In fact,
just as with the citizenship exception, we see a good amount of conflict
between treaty negotiators (often the executive) and treaty ratifiers (often
the legislature). These conflicts were exemplified by the process of
ratification of the Supplementary Treaty on Extradition between the
United States and the United Kingdom in 1985.243 In the 1970s and 1980s,
U.S. courts denied a number of extradition requests from the United
Kingdom based on findings that acts of terrorism by Irish Republican
Army members constituted political offenses and therefore were not
extraditable crimes.244 In order to prevent further such occurrences, the
Reagan and Thatcher Administrations concluded a supplementary
extradition agreement, removing the political offense exception from the
treaty.245 The U.S. Senate, however, motivated by concern about potential
prejudicial prosecutions, ratified the treaty only after adding a provision
that authorized a court to deny extradition where the accused individual
faced prejudice because of his race, religion, nationality, or political
opinions.246 The Senate, thus, in direct contradiction to Reagan
Administration efforts, reinserted political considerations into the newly
negotiated extradition treaty.
To summarize, there are good reasons why the political offense
exception may be beneficial to states, both from an institutionalist
perspective and from a domestic politics perspective. From an
institutionalist perspective, the exception reduces the harmful reputational
effects of noncompliance while still ensuring compliance in the vast
majority of cases. From a domestic perspective, the exception allows
government officials to reap the benefits of extradition arrangements
without undue harm to officials in the other state. The specific value of the
political offense exception, however, depends heavily on the intensity of
domestic preferences and the structure and substance of the extradition
treaty. Different institutions within a state may have conflicting
243. Supplementary Extradition Treaty With The United Kingdom, U.S.-U.K., June 25, 1985, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 99-8.
244. See James T. Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The Taking ofJoe Doherty, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
317, 342 n.96 (1992).
245. Some have concluded that Thatcher was further motivated by the attempt on her life at
Brighton. In addition, Senate action on the treaty looked unlikely until the terrorist bombing in West
Berlin that killed and injured a number of American military officers. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The
'Political Offense Exception" Redsited: Extradition Between the U.S. and the U.K - A Choice Between Friendy
Cooperation AmongAllies and Sound Law and Polig, 15 DENV.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255, 280 (1987).
246. Extradition Supplementary Treaty Between the United States of America and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., art. 3, § a, Dec. 23, 1986, T.I.A.S. No.
12,050. See Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, U.S.-U.K., at 4-5, June 26,
1986, S. ExEC. REP. No. 99-17 (1986).
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preferences with regard to the substantive exceptions to international
agreements. To a certain extent, the flexibility granted to states under the
exception may be traded off against the rigidity of other treaty obligations.
The depth of treaty obligations may be offset by a relatively permissive
political offense exception. Similarly, when extraditions are expected to be
highly contentious and politically explosive affairs, a political offense
exception may be necessary to deflect criticism from decision-makers.
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION OBLIGATIONS
The final, and perhaps most essential, question this paper will address is
why states comply with their extradition obligations. After all, if the
international law of extradition exerts no influence on how states act, then
the structure and substance of extradition treaties has little value. Until we
understand how extradition treaties in reality affect the behavior of states,
we cannot arrive at any useful understanding of state behavior in the
context of extradition.
Institutionalist theories of international law focus our attention on
aggregated state interests in order to understand when states will comply
with treaty obligations. Goldsmith and Posner argue that there are many
reasons why states might comply with international law even if that law
exerts absolutely no normative pull on their decision-making. Behavioral
regularities between states arise from four behavioral logics. The first
behavioral logic is "coincidence of interest," when states perceive a private
advantage from the same action, whether or not other parties engage in
that action. 247 The second logic is coercion, where a powerful state forces
other states to act in ways they otherwise would not in the absence of such
force.248 Third, behavioral regularities arise out of cooperation, understood
as states acting in a certain way to achieve long-term mutual gains, even at
the expense of short-term gains that could be achieved by cheating.249 As
Goldsmith and Posner explain it, this prisoner's dilemma can be solved as
long as states expect to interact for a sufficiently long period of time.250
Finally, behavioral regularities may arise when states face coordination
problems, that is, if states coordinate on similar moves, they will both
receive higher payoffs than if they do not coordinate. 251
Goldsmith and Posner's theory of compliance is supported by Guzman,
who has argued that formal international agreements are merely tools that
247. Goldsmith & Posner, A Theof ofCustomay IntemationalLaw, supra note 85, at 1114.
248. Id. at 1114-15.
249. Id. at 1115.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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states use to enhance the credibility of their commitments.252 Guzman
argues that there are many areas in which states have an interest in being
able to make credible commitments to other states. They cannot, however,
conclude enforceable contracts of the sort that individuals and
corporations conclude in the domestic context, because there is no
supranational court to enforce these agreements. Instead, they use another
form of sanctions, either direct or reputational. 253 A state that often breaks
its commitments is an unappealing partner and will find it more difficult to
enter into mutually beneficial arrangements with other states in the future.
A state with a reputation for breaking its agreements will find it
increasingly difficult to convince other states that its agreements hold any
weight. Guzman's argument is not new: In The Republic, Plato wrote that
the just and law-abiding are "wiser, and better, and more able to act than
the unjust, who are indeed, incapable of any combined action." 254 Even if
a state with a bad reputation manages to enter into agreements in the
future, other states will take into account the risk of breach, leading to a
less favorable agreement. 255
From this point of view, we can reach a number of conclusions about
why states comply with extradition obligations. First, they may extradite
individuals because they see a specific benefit arising from their removal.
The removal of criminals, murderers, thieves, and other undesirables from
a state brings a clear benefit to any state interested in the rule of law.
Second, states may extradite individuals when a more powerful state forces
them to do so. The United States, for example, may be able to force other
states to extradite individuals by threatening other forms of sanctions if
they do not comply with their extradition obligations. Third, states may
extradite individuals when they understand that, in the long run,
cooperation with other states in this area is beneficial. Even if a state
perceives a short-term interest in not extraditing a popular figure, it may
still extradite him if it fears the long-term consequences of refusing to
cooperate. These consequences may be limited to extradition issues, for
example other states' refusal to extradite individuals sought by the state.
But consequences may also be felt in other areas of cooperation, such as
aid or trade. Any and all of these factors may be at play in any given
extradition decision.
Where institutionalist theories of international law fall short, however, is
in understanding how norms of compliance can be internalized and either
strengthened or weakened through domestic agencies. Harold Koh has
252. See Guzman, supra note 92.
253. See Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theof ofInternaionalLaw, supra note 85, at 1861, 1865.
254. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 32 (Wordsworth 1999).
255. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theog ofInternaionalLaw, supra note 85, at 1864-65.
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described this phenomenon as a kind of "transnational legal process." 256
He uses transnational legal process to attempt to answer the question of
why states obey international law.257 Koh defines obedience in
contradistinction to mere compliance, which he defines as following a rule
in order to gain specific rewards or avoid specific punishments.
Obedience, he explains, occurs when a state has "internaliZed the norm and
incorporated it into its own internal value system." 258
Koh argues that a nation's repeated participation in the transnational
legal process is an important factor in determining whether states will obey
international law. The first step in this process is interaction, in which
transnational actors (states, NGOs, or individuals) come together in a law-
declaring forum. 259 The interaction then forces an interpretation or
articulation of the international law at issue in the law-declaring forum.
This interpretation aims to force the parties to internalize the law into their
normative system. Once the international law is internalized into a state's
internal value set, the state will tend to obey the law.260
Transnational legal process sees individuals and groups as important
actors in the internalization of international legal norms. NGOs and
prominent individuals play the role of "transnational norm entrepreneurs"
who mobilize popular opinion and political support for the norm.261
Domestic departments and bureaucrats increase the pressure on
governments to comply with international law. Bureaucracies may develop
institutional habits that lead them into patterns of compliance with the
law.262 All of these function as mechanisms by which nonstate actors affect
state behavior towards international law.
Transnational legal process suggests that in order to explain why states
obey extradition treaties, we need to look at the extent to which a state has
internalized treaty norms. How has a state's legislature ratified or adopted
the treaty? How has the judiciary interpreted and enforced the treaty? Has
the executive given attention and priority to extradition proceedings? Just
as importantly, what kind of pressure have domestic individuals and
groups exerted? Have influential actors come out in favor of complying
256. For a more thorough explanation of Koh's vision of transnational legal process, see Koh,
The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, supra note 85; Koh, The 'Haiti
Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Polig, supra note 85; Koh, Refugees, the Courts and the New World
Order, supra note 85; Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 85; Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, supra note 85.
257. See Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, supra note 85, at
626-27.
258. Id at 628 (italics in original).
259. Id. at 644. The law-declaring forum may be a court within an international organization or a
tribunal within domestic law.
260. Id
261. Id at 647.
262. Id at 648.
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with extradition obligations, or have they voiced concern or anger at
extradition proceedings? These domestic actors can have just as much
influence on a state's decision to comply with international law as a state's
general interest in extradition treaties as a whole.
Take the NatWest case from 2004, cited above, in which several high-
profile British bankers were extradited to the United States to face trial on
charges of financial fraud. 263 There, the British government faced pressure
from the London financial community to refuse extradition of the
requested bankers. A powerful lobby of banks, the media, and civil rights
groups came together to resist extradition. Despite their efforts, the
government acquiesced to the United States' requests. This result may
partially be explained by the extent to which the U.S.-U.K. extradition
treaty's norms had already been internalized by government actors in the
United Kingdom. At the same time, the lobby of disparate groups, what
Koh might describe as transnational norm entrepreneurs, managed to
influence the future direction of those norms. A few years after the
NatWest extradition, the British Parliament enacted a statute giving the
home secretary authority to veto the extradition of British citizens. 264 In
the future, the British government would never be obliged to extradite
British citizens in the face of fierce domestic criticism. This change was
heavily affected by the coalition of actors that went into action to support
the NatWest bankers and eventually gathered considerable public
support.265
Nonstate actors and interest groups thus have the power to promote
obedience to international law, but also to ratify breaches of international
law. They do so by harnessing public opinion in order to change the
incentives of government decision-makers. Politicians who face re-election
have an interest in pleasing their constituents. Government officials in
nondemocratic countries may feel this pressure less, but even they must
please powerful forces within their countries. Elected judges also have
incentives to rule in ways that are politically popular, while nonelected
judges may be somewhat sheltered from shifting public perceptions. Law
enforcement officials may have incentives to spend resources on particular
activities, and thus the incentive to actually find and arrest suspects may
vary. Each of these actors may also have conflicting incentives to
cooperate with foreign actors, particularly if they interact on a regular basis
263. See Cowell, supra note 215; Murphy, supra note 213; UK Extradites Three Bankers, supra note
215.
264. See David Leppard, Minister Gets Power to Veto US Extraditions, SUNDAY TIMES (London),
Oct. 14, 2007, at 4.
265. It is unclear how this unilateral change of policy by the United Kingdom was viewed in the
United States. The U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty did not provide for a citizenship exception, and the
statute, or at least its use, could very well be considered a breach of the treaty's terms.
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and need to cultivate mutually advantageous relationships. 266 These
incentives sometimes militate in favor of compliance with extradition
obligations, while at other times they militate against compliance.
Ultimately, the decision-maker must weigh the net benefits of compliance
against the net costs of compliance in order to proceed.
Up to this point, we have addressed the question of compliance in a
relatively straightforward manner. Actors either have incentives to comply
or they have incentives to breach. Other states view their actions as
compliant or noncompliant and respond accordingly. Current international
law theory relies on this binary understanding of compliance. 267
What current theory fails to identify, however, is perhaps the key factor
in explaining extradition decisions, what I describe as "compliance
uncertainty." Compliance uncertainty occurs when states are uncertain
what actions count as compliance with treaty obligations. 268 Compliance
uncertainty thus deconstructs the orthodox conception of compliance as a
binary phenomenon. As this article has attempted to show, the history of
extradition demonstrates that clear judgments regarding compliance are
not always possible. In many instances, what counts as compliance is
unclear. Did France violate its extradition treaty with the United States
when it refused to extradite hijackers who claimed their hijacking was
politically motivated? Was Thailand's extradition of Viktor Bout, the Lord
of War businessman, to the United States a violation of international law, as
Russia claims? Was Nathan Robbins justly extradited to Great Britain for
his mutiny aboard a British ship, when he was himself a U.S. citizen?
These questions are not easy to answer. But more significantly, the very
difficulty of answering them is an important variable in state decision
making. For whether one believes that states are worried about a
reputation for law-abidingness, or whether one believes that nonstate
actors exert pressure on government officials to comply with international
law, the depth and strength of that influence depends on an ability to
determine what counts as compliance. After all, if there is no independent
266. See Jenia lontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International GiminalJustice, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 985 (2007); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatoy Networks and Their limits, 34 YALE
J. INT'L L. 113, 122-29 (2009).
267. But see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 31
(2005) (arguing that cooperative strategies between states are possible only if "the parties . . . know
what counts as cooperation and what counts as cheating").
268. Compliance uncertainty should be distinguished from vagueness. If an agreement contains
vague provisions, then it may be difficult for the parties to know what the agreement requires in
terms of state actions. In this sense, treaty vagueness may contribute to situations of compliance
uncertainty. Other factors may also contribute to compliance uncertainty, including lack of factual
knowledge and conceptual disagreements between the parties. Whie a certain degree of compliance
uncertainty is present in nearly all legal agreements, its significance is especially pronounced in
international agreements, where there is no tribunal that can definitively settle disputes about treaty
interpretation. See generally WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960).
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judge or objective criterion by which a state's extradition decision can be
measured, then the power of reputation and norms is diminished. A state's
reputation for law-abidingness is decreased when it is seen as violating its
obligations, but if there is a legitimate dispute about whether it met those
obligations, the reputational harm will be lower. Likewise, domestic
pressure to comply with treaty norms is diminished when it is unclear how
those treaty norms apply in concrete cases.
Compliance uncertainty may therefore be a beneficial phenomenon for
government actors when deciding whether to pursue a course of action.
For example, if a foreign government has requested the extradition of a
politically popular figure, politicians may face domestic pressure to deny
the extradition request. If the denial could be clearly identified as a breach
of treaty obligations, then they might face either direct or reputational
sanctions from the requesting state, as well as from other states who view
the denial as a sign that the country does not take its extradition
obligations seriously. If, however, the denial is not clearly a breach and
could plausibly be viewed as compliant with the treaty, then politicians
may be able to reap the rewards of appeasing domestic interest groups
without suffering the accompanying reputational harms. Compliance
uncertainty, then, may be an effective tool for domestic decision-makers in
certain circumstances.
At the same time, uncertainty regarding what counts as compliance
creates costs for states in a number of ways. 269 First, in negotiating treaties,
states will recognize that compliance uncertainty may reduce cooperation
rates. Negotiators can attempt to prevent this problem by drafting
agreements with more specific requirements and thereby reduce to some
extent the possibility of compliance uncertainty, although a certain amount
of uncertainty appears to be inherent in treaties.270 Where compliance
269. Contract theorists have explored extensively the costs and benefits of including vague
provisions in contracts. Traditional theory holds that vague provisions occur when the benefits of
reducing ex ante negotiation expenses outweigh the costs of increasing ex post litigation expenses.
Recent theory has explained vague provisions as the consequence of agency conflicts, adverse
signaling effects, and information screens. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston,
Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambguity, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 902 (1998); Albert Choi & George
Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008); Albert
Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119
YALE L.J. 848 (2010); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1581
(2005); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Desgn, 115 YALE L.J.
814 (2006); Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289
(2006); Kathryn Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND . EcoN. 432 (1992); George G.
Triantis, The Eficeng of Vague Contract Terms: A Response To the Schwartq-Scott Theof of U.CC Article 2,
62 LA. L. REv. 1065 (2002).
270. For a discussion of vagueness in contracts and treaties, see Tom Baker, Alon Harel &
Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law:An ExperimentalApproach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 479-
81 (2004); Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminag in Arms Control Regimes: The Case of the
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uncertainty is a worry, the time and expense of negotiating treaties may be
higher.271 Second, states may not be able to develop enduring cooperative
strategies if they cannot easily and clearly identify the actions that count as
cooperative moves. 272 In other words, if a state cannot determine whether
the other state complied with the treaty in a given instance, then the state
will not know whether to retaliate against the other state. This
circumstance might lead to a wholesale breakdown in cooperative systems,
and may in fact reduce the number of treaties if states believe that
extradition treaties have no effect on behavior.
It may be asked, then, how cooperation can persist in the face of
compliance uncertainty. The cooperative dynamic is premised on the
assumption that states can identify and punish, either through direct or
reputational sanctions, instances of breach. Reputational sanctions may be
particularly important in encouraging cooperation in extradition, where
communication occurs through international networks of government
sub-units that interact regularly.273 This tit-for-tat strategy breaks down as
the severity of compliance uncertainty increases.274 In other words, if a
state has no information about another state's action, then it cannot reliably
punish the other state for breaching a treaty: It does not know what the
other state has done, let alone whether it breached. However, a number of
studies have shown that, even where it is difficult to identify an action as
cooperative or uncooperative, cooperation dynamics may develop if the
parties can make reasonable inferences about the behavior of other
parties. 275 As long as the communication from one party to the other is not
overly "noisy," or uncorrelated with the actual state of affairs, then
cooperation may persist, particularly if decisions are delegated to
sufficiently reliable decision-makers that other parties view as super partes.
Let us take a close look at the Roman Polanski case from the
perspective of uncertainty. Assuming that the U.S.-Switzerland extradition
treaty required Switzerland to extradite Polanski to the United States, there
are a number of reasons why Switzerland would want to comply with
those obligations. It might want to preserve a reputation for abiding by the
terms of its agreements. As described above, this reputation is of value to
Biological Weapons Convention, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 271, 272-73 (2007); Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of
Overbreadth, 83 NYU L. REv. 1491, 1493-96 (2008); Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in
VAGUENESS IN NORMATIVE TEXTS 27, 27-48 (Bhatia et al. eds., 2005); see also Compte, supra note
176; Mailath & Morris, supra note 176.
271. On the other hand, if states believe that more specific treaties will not be able to reduce
compliance uncertainty significantly, they may spend less time, not more, negotiating treaties. States
will likely be less willing to invest in treaties that do not promise important benefits.
272. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 267, at 31.
273. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International law is Domestic
(Or. The European Way ofLaw), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327, 334-35 (2006).
274. See supra note 176.
275. Id.
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Switzerland, for it allows the country to continue to enter into beneficial
agreements with other states. It also helps ensure that other countries
continue to abide by their agreements with Switzerland. There might be a
strong pro-international law lobby within the country that exerts influence
over key decision-makers. Switzerland might have domestic institutions
that have internalized the treaty's norms and attempt to enforce those
norms. Transnational nongovernmental organizations might criticize the
country for failing to live up to its commitments.
All this changes, however, if one recognizes the difficulty of pinpointing
what counts as compliance: How can one reliably and consistently
determine whether extradition decisions comply with treaty terms? How
can other states determine whether Switzerland's denial of the extradition
request actually constitutes a violation of its international obligations? If
other countries do not perceive Switzerland's denial of extradition as a
breach, then they will not discount the value of Switzerland's present and
future promises. Of course, the United States itself would protest and
might actually sanction Switzerland in some way. Indeed, when a State
Department spokesman was asked whether he believed Switzerland's
rationale for denying extradition, he responded, "Please." 276 But the
reputational harm from the rejection will likely be limited because it is not
easy to determine whether Switzerland's actions constituted a breach. The
reputational harm may be limited to relations with the United States, and
not with other countries. As mentioned earlier, reputational harm is in
general considered the strongest mechanism for compliance in
institutionalist theories of international law, and therefore the uncertainty
of determining what counts as compliance could dramatically affect state
decision-making.
Similarly, domestic pressure, and the state preferences that domestic
pressure conditions and structures, will be affected by the uncertainty of
determining compliance. If individuals and groups view Switzerland's
denial of extradition as compliant with international legal norms, or at least
not an affirmative breach, they may not exert the influence they otherwise
would. In other words, if groups interested in complying with international
law cannot adequately determine whether Switzerland has complied or
breached, their influence is lessened. Domestic actors will not feel the
same kinds of strong incentives to extradite that would exist if the failure
to extradite could clearly be identified as a breach of Switzerland's
international obligations.
This Part has argued that compliance uncertainty is an essential variable
in any formulation of how and when states comply with their international
276. See Daily Press Briefing, Philip J. Crowley, U.S. Dep't of State (July 12, 2010), available at
http://tinyurl.com/76b5x6n.
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extradition obligations. When an action cannot clearly be identified as a
breach, states may be more willing to engage in the action, because the
reputational and normative consequences of the action will be lower. At
the same time, this uncertainty creates costs for states because they cannot
know the actions that will count as cooperation, and thus cooperative
logics may break down. Domestic actors recognize, and take advantage of,
this uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
Extradition is an oft-misunderstood element of international law. This
misunderstanding can partially be explained by the tendency of
commentators to analyze extradition through the lens of rational state
interests. This Article has attempted to correct this failing by
demonstrating how domestic structures can influence the demand for and
compliance with extradition treaties. Domestic groups and institutions
affect the form and manner of state interaction through extradition, both
by shaping the preferences of government officials and by constraining the
powers of domestic decision-makers. Extradition, then, may usefully be
understood as an expression of the interests and incentives of nonstate
actors in international criminal cooperation. It is hoped that this Article
will spark further debate about what these interests and incentives may be.
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